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The Duty to "Expect the Unexpected":
Mitigating Extreme Natural Threats to the
Global Commons Such as Asteroid and Comet
Impacts with the Earth
EVAN R. SEAMONE
This Article develops a framework to govern the
interactions of nations cooperating to mitigate the
threat of unexpected natural disasters that potentially
could affect them all. It uses asteroid impact with the
Earth as the representative example because this is an
"unusual and extreme" disaster that has created
difficulty for lawmakers due to its many unanswerable
questions. By explaining a number of the legal
requirements necessary to mitigate such threats, this
Article identifies legal principles that apply equally to
natural threats throughout the global commons. The
law involved in this analysis arises, in great part, from
the judicial recognition of a state's duty of self-
preservation. To this end, the American civil defense
experience provides guidance on the extent of a
government's duty to plan for the unknown, as does the
Vorsorgeprinzip in Germany. At the international
level, the doctrine of "cooperative preservation"
requires nations to cooperate in joint preventive
actions to mitigate dangers so great that no single
country alone could effectively protect its citizens from
the harm. In order to obtain greater insight into
developing an international framework for mitigating
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extreme natural disasters, this Article considers
examples of the law applied to existing efforts to
mitigate transboundary nuclear and biochemical
disasters, multinational forest fires, and the spread of
new and re-emerging infectious diseases across
international borders.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 7, 2003, concurrent with a change in the national
threat level from yellow ("elevated risk") to orange ("high risk"), U.S.
Attorney General John Ashcroft warned the American public: "This
decision for an increased threat condition designation is based on
specific intelligence ... corroborated by multiple intelligence
sources."' The statement echoed similar warnings, which sounded in
Australia only a few short months before, as then Acting Attorney
General for Australia Chris Ellison stated, "[b]e alert but not
alarmed," based on "credible" information that an attack on Australia
was being planned.2 Increasingly, commentators have criticized these
imprecise warnings on the grounds that governments are
accomplishing little more than the creation of mass panic? Others
admit that these warnings are the best that governments can do,
marking "a strange new climate in which general warnings are issued
to protect us from an undefined threat."4 Yet, without focusing on the
content of such warnings, the very existence of these public alerts,
combined with the great lengths to which governments have gone in
communicating them, are indicative of a crucial responsibility: the
duty to prepare citizens for those threats that are unknowable by their
very nature.'
Because this situation is similar to the one faced by public
1. Michael Kilian, U.S. Raises Terrorism Alert Level: "Specific Intelligence" of
Threats Cited, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 8, 2003, at I (citing U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft).
2. The Terror of an Unspecied Risk, AGE (MELBOURNE), Nov. 21, 2002, at 16
[hereinafter Unspecified Risk] (citing Australian Acting Attorney General Chris Ellison).
3. Suggesting the counterproductive nature of such warnings, one critic questioned,
"[w]hat is the point of putting out a general alert which gives you no idea of timing or place
and then tell[ing] everyone not to panic?" Tighter Security for Aussie Icons, NEWCASTLE
HERALD (AUSTL.), Nov. 21, 2002, at 45 [hereinafter Tighter Security].
4. Unspecifed Risk, supra note 2, at 1.
5. "A Federal Government in receipt of credible information but failing to pass that on
to the public, would be irresponsible to the extreme." Tighter Security, supra note 3, at 45
(citing Australian Premier Bob Carr).
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planners in the 1960s, who were under great pressure to prepare
citizens for the aftermath of an all-out nuclear war, it is not
necessarily true that a duty to "expect the unexpected" is anything
new. 6 Recognizing the common elements of governmental responses
to no-notice threats can provide significant guidance for addressing
such threats. Another example of no-notice threats, which serves as
the focus of this Article, consists of transboundary harms in which no
human is responsible for their creation.
This Article addresses "extreme ' 7 natural threats that endanger
multiple countries simultaneously, in particular the threat of "natural
impact"-i.e., the threat of asteroids or comets striking the Earth.
These threats are particularly dangerous because they are not
preceded by the many indicators that enable law enforcement
agencies to prevent acts of terrorism, such as "chatter," the transfer of
large sums of money, and odd travel patterns." Often, natural threats
cannot be prevented, which means that equal, if not greater, emphasis
must be placed on post-disaster response.9  Consequently, the
prototype for identifying the duties of governments to plan for and act
in the face of massive harm cannot be the traditional, isolated natural
disaster, such as the tornado, earthquake, or typhoon, which does not
necessarily involve an international response.
While the date of the next asteroid or comet disaster remains
unknown, the potential for serious harm from these objects cannot be
denied.o° Although the much glamorized "global killer" (perhaps as
large as ten kilometers in diameter"), which would potentially
6. See infra Parts III.A.2 & V.C (discussing aspects of the American civil defense
experience).
7. Risk analysts often describe these events as "rare, severe, and outside the normal
range of experience in question." Vicki M. Bier et al., A Survey of Approaches jbr Assessing
and Managing the Risk of Extremes, 19 RISK ANALYSIS 83, 83 (1999).
8. E.g., Chris Mclaughlin, War Chat Boom, SUNDAY MIRROR (U.K.), Dec 1, 2002, at 8
(discussing methods of predicting terrorist attacks based on surveillance techniques).
9. HARLAN CLEVELAND, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: POLICY FOR THE PLANET 57-58
(1989) (recognizing as "an important advance in consensus" the desire to address both
prevention and adaptation to global harm rather than treating the two as mutually exclusive).
10. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS NEAR EARTH
OBJECTS 16 (U.K., Sept. 2000) [hereinafter U.K. TASK FORCE REPORT]; Martin E.B. France,
Planetary Defense: Eliminating the Giggle Factor, AIR & SPACE POWER CHRON., at 1 (Aug.
7, 2000), available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.afmil/airchronicles/cc/france2.html
(citing numerous sources and related statistics for the proposition that "the threat is real");
Evan R. Seamone, Note, When Wishing on a Star Just Won't Do: The Legal Basis for
International Cooperation in the Mitigation of Asteroid Impacts and Similar Transboundary
Disasters, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1101-04 (2002).
11. In reality, asteroids or comets with the potential to cause "global" harm range in
size, depending on the nature of harm. For a synopsis of the types of harm that would be
created by different size asteroids or comets, see U.K. TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at
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eliminate most life on Earth, might only occur after many millions of
years,' 2 our planet is bombarded daily with countless smaller objects.'3
At least three events, in Tunguska, the Amazon, and Central Asia,
within the last 100 years alone would have killed "thousands and
perhaps hundreds of thousands," had they occurred in more populated
areas.' 4  While most objects end up in the Earth's oceans, the
closeness in time of these recorded smaller-scale events on land
suggests that nations will probably have to deal with some level of
harm from the sky within the next century. 5
Regarding threats of the highest magnitude, the results of the
bombardment of Jupiter by the Shoemaker Levy-9 comet' 6 basically
confirm the statement of U.S. Representative George E. Brown, Jr.:
If some day in the future we discover well in advance
that an asteroid that is big enough to cause a mass
extinction is going to hit the Earth, and then we alter
the course of that asteroid so that it does not hit us, it
will be one of the most important accomplishments in
16. Yet, based on these figures, it is probably safe to say that an impact on the magnitude of
10 km. would produce harm roughly the equivalent of the dinosaur extinction. See France,
supra note 10, at 1.
12. Clark R. Chapman et al., The Comet/Asteroid Impact Hazard: A Systems Approach
at 6 and tbl. 1 (Feb. 24, 2001) (unpublished White Paper, on file with the Southwest Research
Institute Office of Space Studies), available at http://www.boulder.swri.edu/clark/neowp
.html.
13. See Herbert Adams, Close Encounters of the Bolide Kind: Of Meteorites and
Mainers, available at http://www.scarboroughmaine.com/slct/referen/a03/rplOO3.html
(reprinted excerpt from 2(3) HABITAT: J. MAINE AUDUBON SOC'Y (1985)):
Meteoroids orbit our Sun in great swarms, each particle on its own path parallel
to its neighbors, most being little more than dust-sized bits that burn quickly and
brightly when they stray into the upper atmosphere of our planet. About 25
million bits of this cosmic dust-from 10 to 100 tons of matter-bum up in our
atmosphere and filter down, quietly adding to the weight of our Earth every day.
Simon P. Worden explains that every year, there are roughly "30-odd impacts on the upper
atmosphere" of the Earth large enough to result in "a bright flash accompanied by a
damaging shock wave," raising the concern that warring nations might misinterpret these
events as attacks. Brigadier General Simon P. Worden, Deputy Director for Operations of
U.S. Space Command, Military Perspectives on the Near-Earth Object (NEO) Threat 1 (Jul.
10, 2002) available at http://www.spaceref.com/news/ viewpr.html?pid=8834.
14. Id. at 3; Worden, supra note 13, at 2.
15. Chapman et al., supra note 12, at 4 ("[T]here is a much higher chance ... that we or
our grandchildren will actually have to deal with [a threat that is approximately 200 meters or
greater but less than one kilometer] during this century.").
16. For a concise discussion of the 1994 bombardment of Jupiter by the comet with
accompanying photographs of the damage caused to Jupiter, see U.K. TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 10, at 15.
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all of human history. 7
Many characteristics of natural impact threats are common to
all natural threats that endanger the global commons, as well as to
harms originating from humans. Understanding applicable
governmental duties requires an analysis of domestic and
international law, historical precedents, and various aspects of risk
analysis.
Part II of this Article discusses the sources of legal duties
regarding unforeseen natural threats. It identifies a spectrum of
choices ranging from traditional concepts of blame and liability, at
one pole, to "good will" and charity, at the other. The nature of
"exotic," unfamiliar natural threats cannot be addressed sufficiently at
either of these poles; instead, nations need to proceed from more
traditional, intermediate notions rooted in the concept of self-
preservation.
Part III identifies common principles of law that have existed
in governmental efforts at self-preservation from historic times to the
present. By identifying four common functions of domestic and
international law that have appeared repeatedly in court decisions and
legislation, Part III helps identify parameters for any efforts mounted
by governments to combat the unknown. In order to examine the
legal obligations of governments, Part III also focuses on judicial
decisions related to the American civil defense era, during which
courts examined specific attributes of preparedness programs.
Part IV explores the execution of governmental duties by
examining current efforts by governments to address three similarly
unpredictable transboundary harms: (1) nuclear reactor emergencies
and nuclear and biological counterterrorism; (2) transboundary forest
fire mitigation; and (3) efforts to detect and contain the international
spread of exotic infectious diseases. Each area features not only
many of the legal measures addressed in Part III, but also a common
organizational structure and method for improving responsiveness to
crises, particularly through the use of simulated exercises.
Part V applies existing law to the asteroid and comet threat.
First, it recognizes that over-reliance on the law and policy related to
space, i.e., the source of the threat, coupled with a lack of reliance on
the law and policy related to the effects of the threat, have largely
prevented the development of a more extensive legal regime to
govern international responses to natural impact. After explaining the
need for a combined source- and effects-based policy approach, Part
17. France, supra note 10, at 8.
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V then addresses how the law overcomes common human reactions to
exotic threats, such as the "giggle factor," in relation to the science-
fiction element of asteroid and comet impact. ,1
Part VI conciudes with three key recommendations on how to
structure the optimal international approach to natural impact,
providing insight into responses for other types of natural and
unpreventable harm. The first recommendation suggests the adoption
of a "unified command" model, similar to existing approaches in
varied settings, but one that is supplemented by regional agreements
addressing unique circumstances. The role of the joint operations
center would be to develop binding regulations, provide oversight,
and offer guidance on various issues. Necessarily, this means
removing sole responsibility from the United Nations ("U.N.")
committees in charge of space issues because their approaches are
often ill-suited to taking immediate action in the face of grave
danger.' 9 The second recommendation urges nations to consult with
the international agencies that have learned how to prepare for
unpredictable events after years of trial and error-i.e., the facilitators
of the TOPOFF and INEX exercises,20 the Northeastern Fire
Protection Commission,2' and the commission that recently revised
the International Health Regulations.22 The third recommendation
calls for nations to conduct two simulated exercises addressing
combined aspects of natural impact mitigation.
In addressing any natural threat, simulations can provide
responses to many questions that, at first, may appear "impossible" to
answer. This approach fosters cooperation with existing agencies and
mutual exercises, which will assist in reducing costs and enable
18. Id. at 1; infra note 195, and accompanying discussion.
19. Dr. Jirgen Reifarth, for example, explains why he "would prefer a bilateral or
unilateral approach [to space disaster], which-at least in the beginning-should be placed
outside the U.N.": "Unlike other subjects discussed in the Outer Space Committee of the
United Nations, the topic of space debris does not involve a balancing of interests; what is
important is that the common safety interests of the space nations be satisfied." Jurgen
Reifarth, An Appropriate Legal Format for the Discussion of the Problem of Space Debris, in
ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE 301, 309 (Karl-Heinz B6ckstiegel
ed., 1988) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS]. Dr. Eilene Galloway reaches a similar
conclusion based on the inadequacy of the Outer Space Treaty's warning mechanisms for
dangerous situations. "Although the method of notifying the United Nations Secretary
General of space debris damages to beneficial functions is desirable, it is not adequate for
solving various environmental problems." Eilene Galloway, The Present Status of the
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, in
ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS, supra, at 81, 98.
20. Infra Part IV.A.
21. InfraPartIV.B.
22. Infra Part V.C.
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evaluation of the natural impact mitigation program's effectiveness.
The development of a functioning international regime addressing
natural impacts will also greatly further the establishment of
parameters for mitigating any widespread no-notice harm originating
in the global commons, a policy area that currently lacks a coherent
international approach.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF BINDING OBLIGATIONS TO MITIGATE
NATURAL HARM
When courts discuss the duties of nations to protect their
citizens or abide by standards in their conduct with other states, the
analysis is necessarily a legal one, often relying on treaties, caselaw,
and customary international law. The law applicable to natural
disaster, however, is a particularly narrow field that relies on a more
restrictive "legal" approach, which rejects many of the traditional
theories present in other venues. Consequently, distinguishing the
areas of law that are inapplicable to natural disaster is perhaps just as
important as the subsequent discussion of the applicable law.
Merely focusing on how a court might determine penalties for
failure to comply with duties, where to place blame, and how to
determine monetary damages or reparations for harm in the aftermath
of a serious natural disaster would defeat the purpose of the necessary
legal analysis. In many cases, the harm threatened by extreme
disasters could very well leave defendants unable to satisfy their
obligations and insurance companies unable to pay their policies.23
Instead, the most useful legal principles applicable to natural disaster
must provide a basis for intervention in advance of harm. Only then
can governments intervene with the most meaningful action to aid
potential victims and preserve social and political stability.
Legal approaches applicable to extreme natural disasters, such
as a natural impact, a plague similar to the Black Plague, or the
projected collapse of the Cumbre Vieja Volcano into the ocean, exist
on a continuum.24 On one end of the spectrum, nations might proceed
from principles of blame and culpability. This has been the position
23. See, e.g., Insured Against Disaster: Terrorism-Insurance Bill is Necessary to
Protect Americans, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Home Final Ed.), Nov. 25, 2002, at 6A ("After the
terrorist attacks of Sept. 1 1, reinsurance companies largely stopped offering coverage for
losses stemming from acts of terrorism, because these businesses no longer could afford to do
so.").
24. See Seamone, supra note 10, at 1096-97 (addressing similarities between these and
other particular types of exotic transboundary harms).
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of nations on the issue of space debris.25 Yet, legal standards on even
that issue have been difficult to achieve because it is almost
impossible to prove that a nation caused harm.26 When the threat is
not man-made, as is the case for unforeseen natural harms, principles
of blame remain largely inoperative until the harm has already
occurred, in which case, it may be too late to apply such principles.
Therefore, nations must reject the principle of blame as a legal
framework for mitigating crises like natural impact.
27
At the other end of the spectrum are notions of charity and
"good will." Currently, in dealing with natural disasters of a smaller
magnitude, nations operate from these principles. Even in routine
cases, this framework creates problems, indicating that governments
must also disregard charity as a viable principle, especially when
addressing a larger threat.2" Numerous agencies and organizations
respond on the basis of charity, each with different and incompatible
views that may exacerbate the harm suffered by victims of disaster.2 9
For these reasons, it will be harmful for policymakers to assume that
nongovernmental organizations and various arms of the U.N. will
successfully respond to the harms posed by an unexpected and
extreme natural disaster.30
The optimal approach to the mitigation of sudden and
widespread natural harm rests somewhere near the center of the
continuum where well-settled principles of self-preservation lie.
These principles recognize that governments cease to exist without
citizens whose welfare is preserved. Because such notions are so
fundamental, formal sources of international law and domestic
obligations require intergovernmental cooperation for the purpose of
25. See generally Mark J. Sundahl, Note, Unidentified Orbital Debris: The Case ola
Market Share Liability Regime, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 125, 126 (2000)
(reviewing the development of law on the subject).
26. See id. at 137-38 (explaining why existing approaches, such as insurance and the
liability pool, are ineffective); see also Stephanie Tai & Todd Bissett, 2000 Manfred Lachs
Space Law Moot Court Competition: Winning Briefs, Respondent Brief 13 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 303 (2000) (speculating why, even under the current regime, imposing
liability is nearly impossible).
27. See, e.g., Seamone, supra note 10, at 1114-17.
28. Seeid. at llll-14.
29. JOVICA PATRNOGIC & BoSKO JAKOVLJEVIC, PROTECTION OF HUMAN BEINGS IN
DISASTER SITUATIONS: A PROPOSAL FOR GUIDING PRINCIPLES 8-9 (1989); David W. Sar,
Helping Hands: Aid for Natural Disaster Homeless vs. Aid for "Ordinary Homeless," 7
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 129, 139 (1995).
30. For an example of such estimations, see Michael B. Gerrard & John L. Remo,
Response to Sub-Critical Cosmic Impacts, 52 J. BRIT. INTERPLANETARY SOC'Y 115, 118-20
(1999) (speculating that multiple United Nations' programs will handle the aspects of natural
impact).
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self-preservation.
One very significant obstacle to the attainment of effective
mitigation of natural harm at the international level is the notion that
treaty law is the only source of governmental obligations.3' Many of
the principles that are applicable to extreme natural disasters are
binding, even though they do not exist in any treaty. According to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, international tribunals,
and national courts interpreting international law, there are multiple
"sources of international law" based on the practices of nations over
time and other norms that impose requirements on the joint action of
nations.32
One source of law that applies to a threat like natural impact is
"customary international law.""3 The duty to warn another nation of a
known danger arguably falls within this category.3 4 This duty exists
where nations have met two specific requirements for a customary
obligation-they have: (1) repeatedly engaged in this practice when
dealing with each other over time; and (2) demonstrated their interest
in being bound by the duty.35  Therefore, under customary
international law, as applied to natural impact, once a nation is aware
of an existing threat, its government has a duty to notify any nation
likely to be harmed.36
Another applicable source of law is the obligation to act in
"good faith" when reaching international agreements. This broader
duty is considered a "general principle of international law."37
Different requirements pertain to general principles. These notions
help to fill gaps that would otherwise leave international courts
31. See infra note 200 and accompanying text (describing positions of the United
Nations Committee addressing Near Earth Objects and the United Kingdom's Taskforce).
32. E.g., STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1031 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945), art. 38 (describing sources of international law);
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Martti Kosenkenniemi ed., 2000) (providing a general
overview of how courts and scholars have interpreted principles relating to the sources of
international law).
33. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 26 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 8th
ed. 1955).
34. Deveraux McClatchey, Chernobyl and Sandoz One Decade Later: The Evolution of
State Responsibility for International Disasters, 1986-1996, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 659,
669 (1996).
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
cmt. c (1987).
36. See Seamone, supra note 10, at 1131-33.
37. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS 388-90 (1953) (explaining that these principles "belong to no particular
system of law but are common to them all").
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without a basis to settle a dispute.3" Applied to natural impact, certain
duties to cooperate in detecting the particular threat, or in rendering
aid to those harmed by a comet or asteroid, would arise under general
principles, rather than customary obligations because nations have not
acted in the same manner previously.
Aside from obligations arising from the established practice of
nations, there are also preemptory norms (jus cogens)-legal concepts
which prohibit nations from engaging in specified behaviors.
Genocide and the killing of prisoners of war are two noted examples?"
These norms often overlap with the obligations of nations to the
international community as a whole (obligations erga omnes).40
Applied to natural impact, just as it may be a violation to willingly
destroy an entire society, it may likewise be a violation to fail to act to
prevent similar amounts of devastation resulting from an asteroid or
comet collision.
III. BINDING LEGAL PRINCIPLES ADDRESSING RESPONSES TO
UNEXPECTED NATURAL HARM
There are certain laws, binding upon systems of nations and
the smallest municipalities alike, that arise from the necessity of
governments to function and that have immediate force, even if they
do not exist in writing after ratification by an approving authority."'
The proposition arises from the legal maxim, salus populi est
suprema lex: "Regard for the public welfare is the highest law. ' 42
Pre-planning for an extreme natural disaster invokes the law of self-
preservation, which is so essential that it is virtually "absolute. ' 43
38. MALCOM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 80-81 (4th ed. 1997) (citing cases).
39. Roman Boed, State of Necessity as a Justification for Intentionally Wrongful
Conduct,.3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 32 (2000).
40. In re Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited. (BeIg. v. Spain),
1970 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Feb. 5). Examples noted by the International Court of Justice include the"outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide ... and rules concerning the basic rights of
the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination." Id.
41. For example, after extensive analysis of numerous international practices, the noted
jurist, Prentice, pointed out: "The law of necessity has been stated to be an exception to all
human ordinances and constitutions .. " W.P. PRENTICE, POLICE POWERS ARISING UNDER
THE LAW OF OVERRULING NECESSITY 4 (1894).
42. HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF MAXIMS, CLASSIFIED AND ILLUSTRATED I (10th
ed. 1939); JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 391-92 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690).
43. Noted international law scholar Henry Wheaton recognized as "absolute" a nation's
right of self-preservation respecting other states and duty to self-preserve. HENRY WHEATON,
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Internationally, the rule of self-preservation takes on the
dimension of "cooperative preservation," which requires nations to
cooperate in order to preserve their own citizens in the face of an
international threat. 4" The four principles that arise from duties of
self- and cooperative preservation at the national and international
levels are: (1) the accomplishment of a common objective; (2)
precautionary action; (3) expediency; and (4) discrimination in the
prioritization of measures adopted.
The government's actions pertaining to an individual may be
justified on the basis of a common goal to preserve society45 In the
international realm, to preserve international order, this function of
law would require joint mitigation efforts, even where only one
region may be harmed by an unexpected disaster.4 This idea is also
inherent in the concept of obligations of law, erga omnes, which are
"obligations ... towards the international community as a whole [as]
the common concern of all States," permitting or even commanding
international intervention within the borders of a single nation.
47
Precautionary measures are those that would require
mitigation in advance of actual threats, at both the domestic and
international levels. The precautionary principle, which directs
planning within the European Community, is one example of how this
function of extreme natural disaster mitigation operates. 48 Under the
principle of expediency, small groups, responsible for responding to
international threats at the domestic and international levels, operate
independently without the burdensome requirements of deliberative
forums, such as state legislatures or the U.N. General Assembly.
49
Finally, the discriminatory function of the body of law applicable to
natural impact requires nations and groups of nations to apply the
former three frameworks only to threats that are deserving of
exceptional treatment."
To better understand these principles, the following Section
explores in depth the application of the discriminatory function.'
ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THE SCIENCE 80 (De
Capo ed., 1972) (1836).
44. See Seamone, supra note 10, at 1120-21 (defining term).
45. See infr'a Part IIH.A.
46. See infra Part III.B.
47. Id.
48. See infra Part III.B.
49. See infra Part III.A.2.
50. See infra Part III.A.1.
51. Id.
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After explaining why natural impact meets the standard, an analysis
of caselaw regarding civil defense exercises from the 1940s through
the 1960s follows, offering applications of the other three legal
principles.12 Court decisions from New Jersey, Massachusetts, and
New York discern the legal bases for establishing the duty of
governments to mitigate unforeseen threats. The same factors
addressed in these American cases may be applied to international
law. 3 Understanding the interactions of these principles of law at the
domestic and international levels will enable policymakers to address
the rights and responsibilities related to natural impact in a deliberate
and formulaic manner.
A. Self-Preservation at the National Level
At a national level, self-preservation involves the state's
inherent police power to regulate in the interest of the health, safety,
and welfare of its citizens. J" As noted in Wymhammer v. The People:
It is upon this principle [of the police power] that
health and quarantine laws are established; that a
building is blown up to arrest a conflagration in a
populous town; that the public market is purged of
infectious articles; that merchandise on ship board,
infested with pestilence, is cast into the deep, and
public nuisances are abated. It is the public exigency,
which demands the summary destruction, upon the
maxim, that the safety of society is the paramount law.
It is the application of the personal right or principle of
52. See infra Part III.A.2.
53. See infra Part IlI.B.
54. Chief Justice Marshall identified this power in the Gibbons v. Ogden decision as an
"immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within the territory of a State, not
surrendered to the general government [including] .... Inspection laws, quarantine laws,
health laws of every description .... 22 U.S. 1,203 (1824).
This body of law is so essential, it overrides traditional principles of liability and
property rights:
[l]n cases of actual necessity, -as that of preventing fire, -the ravages of a
pestilence, or any other great calamity, the private property of any individual
may be lawfully taken, used or destroyed for the relief, protection, or safety of
the many, without subjecting the actors to personal liability.
PRENTICE, supra note 41, at 444. As Joseph Chitty recognized, even "[t]he [Crown's]
prerogative is not the iron tie of unbridled power: it holds the subject in the silken chain of
mild subjection, for the general and permanent welfare of society." J. CHITTY, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF THE PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN iii (London, 1820).
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self-preservation to the body politic.1 5
Because the police power calls for prompt action, it is often
called the law of "overruling necessity. ' 56 Waiting ages to develop a
long line of precedent to remedy an immediate threat would defeat the
existence of governments and local order.5 7 The U.S. Supreme Court
has stated: "We reject any principle of governmental helplessness...
which principle, carried to its logical conclusion, must lead to
anarchy."58  Other domestic examples include the German
government's articulation of the Vorsorgeprinzip: "Environmental
policy is not fully accomplished by warding off imminent hazards and
the elimination of damage which has occurred. Precautionary
environmental policy requires furthermore that natural resources are
protected and demands on them are made with care." 9
Planning for threats that have not yet occurred is one aspect of
the duty of self-preservation.6°  The requirement materializes
indirectly in various forms of self-protective legislation, including
vaccinations and quarantine measures, 61 force-feeding those who
refuse to eat,62 requiring motorcycle helmets,63 "Good Samaritan" laws
55. Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 451-52 (N.Y. 1856).
56. PRENTICE, supra note 41, at 4.
57. In his acclaimed treatise on the doctrine of necessity, Prentice recognized well-
settled common law:
Whatever is detrimental to the interests of the public, as understood at the time,
falls within its ban. It is sufficient that this tendency be shown, and we have not
to wait for the appearance of detrimental results .... The welfare and security
of civil society, for which government is constituted and laws are made, are the
common foundation of public policy and statute law, and necessity guides them
both.
Id. at 299.
58. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951) (addressing the need for
governmental response to revolutionary activities).
59. Konrad von Moltke, The Vorsorgeprinzip in West German Environmental Policy,
reprinted in ROYAL COMMISSION ON ENVTL. POLLUTION, TWELFTH REPORT: BEST PRACTICAL
ENVIRONMENTAL OPTION 57, 58 (1988).
60. See infra Part III.A.2.
61. Respecting quarantine, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the authority of a State to
enact quarantine laws and "health laws of every description" on the basis of the police power.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905). Vaccination is similarly justifiable for
serious diseases, as smallpox was at the time of the decision. Id. at 28.
62. Joel K. Greenberg, Hunger Striking Prisoners: The Constitutionality of Force-
Feeding, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 759 (1983) (discussing as a justification for force-
feeding "the preservation of society").
63. Note particularly that the courts upholding such legislation do so on the basis of the
threat to society, not simply the individual who would be harmed: "[A]ll of these decisions
have attempted to characterize this type of legislation as an attempt to protect the public's-
not the affected individual's-health or welfare." KENNETH R. WING, THE LAW AND THE
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compelling individuals to aid those in peril," etc. Aside from the
common argument that governments will cut medical expenses by
implementing such protective measures,65 the necessity of preserving
society also has been cited.66  Such legislation is usually directed
toward predictable threats that can be prevented with proven
measures. After all, a motorcycle rider can minimize the risk of harm
to his head by making a conscious choice to wear a helmet before
traveling.
Before determining the requirements, to mitigate extreme and
unexpected natural disasters, one must answer two questions: (1) what
aspects of such unpredictable threats do governments have the
responsibility to prevent; and (2) what action must governments take
to satisfy their related obligations. Ducey v. United States,67 a case
from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, draws an important
distinction regarding the first question. As to the second inquiry, the
law of civil defense reveals the need for preventive measures in
response to the category of threats posed by natural impacts.
1. The Ducey Case and Identification of the Nature of the Threat
In Ducey, survivors of the victims of a 100-year flood,
occurring on federal recreational land, sought compensation from the
government for failure to warn the victims and to aid in their rescue.6"
The record revealed that the flood had not occurred when predicted
and that the government had issued no warnings of this fact. Much
like other extreme natural disasters, documents revealed that these
types of major flash floods were "not fully understood" and, although
PUBLIC'S HEALTH 36 n.3 (3d ed. 1990). Aside from other rationales, some courts explain that
"society has an interest in maintaining a strong and productive citizenry." Id. at 28.
64. See David C. Biggs, "The Good Samaritan is Packing": An Overview of the
Broadened Duty to Aid Your Fellowman, with the Modern Desire to Possess Concealed
Weapons, 22 DAYTON L. REV. 225, 226-36 (1997) (reviewing various laws in jurisdictions
and recognizing "the movement by states to impose an affirmative duty to aid those who are
victims of natural disasters").
65. See Norman L. Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical
Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 247
n. 100 (1973) (arguing how these rules are "rationalized by reliance on the state's interest in
avoiding the economic burden of an injured person").
66. Id. (recognizing Congdon's precedential value).
67. 830 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1987).
68. This Article is not concerned with the nuances of the Federal Tort Claims Act,
addressed by the court, which permits citizens to sue the government under certain limited
circumstances for harm they suffer. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671, 2680 (2002) (describing
standards as well as exceptions for such claims).
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some occurred, they were "frequently ignored" by policymakers due
to their lack of understanding.69 When the flood finally did occur, it
was seven times greater than projected and resulted in fatalities. The
lower court held that the governmental entity could not have
anticipated a flood so great and found no duty to warn the public of
the unforeseen event.70 The Court of Appeals, however, reversed,
finding clear error in the district court's reasoning:
The record shows that the government was aware that
a life-threatening, 100-year flood was long overdue.
From this awareness, it follows that the government
foresaw the danger of a 100-year flood. Therefore, the
government was under a duty to warn decedents (who
were recreational users of the flood plain) of the
hazards of a major 100-year flood, and to take the
same precautionary measures that a reasonable private
landowner would have taken under those
circumstances.7"
In rendering its ruling, which was based primarily on
traditional principles of tort law, the Ducey Court drew an important
distinction in determining governmental responsibilities.
A government is not liable to warn its citizens of all dangers
or prevent all types of unforeseen events that may cause injury. On
the one hand, the law recognizes that many threats are beyond human
control and responsibility. This notion is clear in force majeure
clauses72 as well as the "Act of God" defense.73 Furthermore, the legal
doctrine of de minimis risk dictates that some threats are simply too
trivial to require the imposition of legal duties.7 4  Courts will
69. Ducey v. United States, 523 F. Supp. 225, 227-28 (D. Nev. 1981).
70. Ducey, 830 F.2d at 1072 ("On remand, the district court found that the flood was
not foreseeable and that defendant had no duty to warn decedents.").
71. Id. at 1072.
72. Michael D. Hodges, The Rights and Responsibilities of Using an International
Waterway, 4 D.C. J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 374, 386 (1995):
An earthquake is an example of a natural disaster that relieves a state's liability.
It is international law that force majeure relieves a party of liability, this
international law even applies to environmental accidents. Also, a national
emergency can give rise to exceptions to the rights and duties otherwise applied
upon a state in international law.
73. See generally Denis Binder, Act of God? or Act of Man?: A Reappraisal of the Act
of God Defense in Tort Law, 15 REv. LITIG. 1 (1996).
74. In courts, the notion arises in the "legal principle de minimis non curat lex; i.e., the
law does not concern itself with trifles." Joseph Fiskel, De Minimis Risk: From Concept to
Practice, in DE MINIMIS RISK 3, 4 (Chris Whipple ed., 1987). See also Robert W. Hahn &
Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Ordero/br Improving Federal Regulation?: Deeper and
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commonly find no governmental liability for claims by hikers who
fall from the edges of cliffs,75 campers attacked by grizzly bears,
7 6
tourists injured by lava-heated ocean water," and people injured due
to the natural accumulation of snow in public areas., In these
scenarios, victims are capable of avoiding the risk and governments
are helpless to monitor the minute details of each citizen's activity.
On the other hand, 100-year floods are threats of an entirely
different nature. Such threats naturally activate the machinery of
governments, requiring investigation and record-keeping that the
average citizen would be unprepared to perform alone. Even though
the flood could not be predicted definitively, certain actions by the
government created further obligations. Of importance to the court
was a letter by an administrator recognizing that the area was overdue
for a flood 9 and transcripts from public meetings in which officials
stressed the need to plan for a major flood based on a "continuing
concern for human life and public safety."80 By rejecting the "Act of
God" defense, notwithstanding the unexpected size of the disaster,'
Ducey suggests that unpredictable threats in the category of natural
Wider Cost Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1524 (2002) ("In the regulatory
context, the principle has special importance. When risks are trivial, it is not likely to be
worthwhile to eliminate them, partly because the effort distracts attention from more serious
problems, partly because of the sheer expense of the effort.").
75. Whalen v. United States, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1099 (D. S.D. 1998) ("To post signs
and build railings everywhere in the park which had the potential for causing harm would not
only defeat the aesthetic purpose of the park but would be cost prohibitive.").
76. Rubenstein v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 654, 656 (N.D. Cal. 1972) ("[T]he danger
of which plaintiff here contends he should have been warned was not specific and was
certainly not known to, or even reasonably foreseeable by, the rangers"); ("The court holds
that a reasonable man under circumstances similar to those described herein would have
realized this type of danger exists in a wild life park and that Mr. Rubenstein either knew or
should have known of the risk of an unprovoked attack."). Id. at 656.
77. Kahan v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1179 (D. Haw. 1999) ("The NPS had
no duty to warn of every possible harm that could befall one who ventured into that area.").
78. See generally Michael J. Polelle, Is the Natural Accumulation Rule All Wet?, 26
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 631, 631 (1995).
79. Ducey, 830 F.2d at 1072 n.l.
80. Id. at 1072 (citing assistant superintendent).
81. The court stated:
The government anticipated that a 100-year flood would result in death. While
it is possible that the extraordinary size of the 1974 flood was a superseding
cause (i.e., an Act of God) making warnings ineffective in preventing the
deaths, the government's failure to warn might have been the proximate cause
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impacts are similarly distinguishable.,2
2. Civil Defense Law and the Extent of Mitigation
Roughly a generation before Ducey, the National Plan for
Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization required all American states
to develop and enact plans for the mitigation of a nuclear attack. 3 To
assist states, the Office of Civil Defense and Mobilization
consequently compared all existing state laws to develop a Model
State Civil Defense Act ("Model Act"), which highlighted key
requirements common to the diverse jurisdictions.4 Certain of these
characteristics shed light on the type of mitigation arguably required
for extreme and unpredicted natural harm.
The "policy and purpose" section of the Model Act explained
that mobilization measures were required for responding to the
"existing and increasing possibilit[ies]" of unknown "disasters of
unprecedented size and destructiveness."5 Threats requiring
mitigation included not only intentional acts of war or sabotage, but
also those related to "fire, flood, earthquake, or other natural
causes."" The primary objective of instituting such measures was to
"insure that preparations of [governments] will be adequate" to
overcome related difficulties. 7
A key section of the Model Act addressed the necessity for
mutual assistance between all governmental agencies and many
private entities. It called for the development of "mutual aid
arrangements for reciprocal civil defense aid and assistance in case of
82. Although studies suggested that a major storm was overdue in the area, id., there
would have been no way to predict with any precision the exact time of the flood. In the same
vein, researchers have reason to suggest the Earth is currently "overdue" for a smaller-scale
impact in a populated area based on ocean strikes that have occurred. Consider that two
additional events similar to Tunguska in 1908 occurred in the 1930s and 1940s in the
Amazon and Central Asia, respectively. With the potential of these two to take the lives of
"thousands and perhaps hundreds of thousands," it is at least arguable that the duty to act on
the threat of natural impact is even greater than the 100-year threat implicated in Ducey.
Worden, supra note 13, at 3.
83. See generally B. WAYNE BLANCHARD, AMERICAN CIVIL DEFENSE 1945-1984: THE
EVOLUTION OF PROGRAMS AND POLICIES (1986), available at http://www.survivalring.org/
nbcprep/FEMA 107.polf (describing the history and development of this doctrine).
84. See generally EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE
MOBILIZATION, COMPARISON OF STATE CIVIL DEFENSE LEGISLATION 1-22 (1960) [hereinafter
CIVIL DEFENSE REPORT].
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disaster too great to be dealt with unassisted."8 Other noteworthy
mandates included the following: the ability to "provide for and
compel the evacuation of all or part of the population from any
stricken or threatened areas.., and to take such steps that are
necessary for the receipt and care of such evacuees";89 expediency
provisions enabling the conduct of mitigation "without regard to time-
consuming procedures and formalities prescribed by law"; 90 the
prohibition of political activity by members of the organization;'
utilization of existing facilities and personnel;92 and the provision of
mobile support units.93
In recognition of the need for preventive measures to combat
unknown threats, the most crucial section of the Model Act provided
that states are required to:
procure supplies and equipment, to institute training
programs and public information programs, and to take
other preparatory steps including the partial or full
mobilization of civil defense organizations in advance
of actual disaster, to insure the furnishing of
adequately trained and equipped forces of civil defense
personnel in time of need.
94
Civil defense agencies responded to these mandates by
implementing nationwide readiness tests, such as "Operation Alert
1961."91
As states enacted the great majority of civil defense legislation
from the mid-1940s to the early 1950S,96 the line of judicial precedent
on civil defense began in 1943 when the New Jersey Court of
Common Pleas decided State v. Natelson Brothers.97 In Natelson
88. Id. § 10, at 15.
89. Id. § 7, at 11.
90. Id. §9, at 15.
91. Id. § 14, at20.
92. Id. § 15.
93. Id. §8, at 12.
94. Id. at 6-7, § 6(c)(3) (emphasis added).
95. See State v. Congdon, 185 A.2d 21, 23 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1962) ("This drill
was part of a national program cooperated in by federal, state and local governments, as well
as the public at large.").
96. While in 1960, "all states... ha[d] civil defense legislation of one type or another,"
it was the case that "laws of a few states were enacted during World War II, those of others
were adopted in the late forties and early fifties, and still others [were] of a more recent
origin." CIVIL DEFENSE REPORT, supra note 84, at i, ii.
97. 32 A.2d 581 (N.J.C.P. Essex County 1943).
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Brothers, the court determined that a business could be held
accountable as a disorderly person for violating rules regarding
compulsory blackouts during air raid drills.98  Upholding New
Jersey's civil defense act, the court explained the necessity of self-
preservation:
To contend that the state was without power to use its
resources and its police powers to protect its people in
time of war from a threatened invasion, or to assist
them in preparing to defend themselves and train
themselves to resist in case of invasion, would be to
say that the state as an instrumentality of protection for
its citizens had ceased to exist. And to further say that
in order to provide this protection for the people the
legislature must by legislative enactment define every
detail and prescribe every administrative function
would be to produce another absurdity.99
The court then proceeded to take judicial notice of a key fact:
[A]cts of war are as unpredictable and uncertain as the
future unknown acts of God; and therefore if the
people are to be protected against them or be trained to
meet them, the power of prescribing the conditions
under which they are to be met must be so flexible as
to permit them to be changed or regulated upon
practically a moment's notice. The person entrusted
with the regulating of these administrative
functions ... must, if he is to be effective, be clothed
with authority to act as situations occur from time to
time. Otherwise the policy of the legislature, namely,
to provide the people of the state with every possible
protection, becomes a nullity.o0
Natelson Brothers recognized that hard and fast rules are
anomalies in the context of disaster response.
Commonwealth v. Reitz, which also pertained to blackouts,
supported Natelson Brothers one year later.ol Under Pennsylvania's
legislation, Mr. Reitz was obliged to take shelter during the sounding
of an air raid siren and reemerge only after the all-clear signal had
98. Id. at 582.
99. Id. at 583.
100. Id. at 583-84.
101. 39 A.2d 522 (Pa. Super Ct. 1944).
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been given.'02 He was arrested after failing to act on a warning from
an air raid warden to stop his business and turn out the lights. The
court relied on Natelson Brothers and found Reitz liable, even though
it was true that his "remote section of Western Pennsylvania" would
have been an unlikely target for enemy attack.0 3
Eleven years later, the New York decision of People ex rel.
Hearn v. Parilli'1 expanded upon the two prior opinions. On June 15,
1955, the City of New York conducted an air raid drill enlisting the
services of neighborhood captains and other safety officials.' 5
Certain individuals intentionally congregated in the City Hall Park,
prior to the drill, with the intention of defying orders to take shelter.'06
After a short-lived protest, they were arrested pursuant to New York's
State Defense Emergency Act of 1951; they defended on the grounds
of religion and expression.' 7 Aside from denying these more generic
claims,'0 8 the Parilli Court rejected an additional alternative defense
that the drill "did not apply to an actual and present danger" and
therefore infringed on the freedoms of individuals compelled to
participate.'09 The dismissal of this claim accorded to preparatory
actions the same deference as to acts initiated to preserve public
safety in times of real exigency.
After the introduction of the National Plan for Civil Defense
and Defense Mobilization, New Jersey decided State v. Congdon,
which related to "Operation Alert 1961." ' "° As in Parilli, a group of
citizens refused to take cover on the grounds of their college campus
once the alarm sounded."' The defendants raised similar claims in
support of their actions: (1) only in times of true exigency would the
statute have effect;" 12 (2) Natelson Brothers only applied to a time of
war;113 and (3) the requirement to participate was an unconstitutional
102. Id. at 523.
103. Id. at 524.
104. 147 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Magis. Ct. 1955).
105. Id. at 625-26.
106. Id. at 626.
107. Id. at 627.
108. Id. at 628 ("[M]otives, however sincere or worthy, cannot 'justify practices
inconsistent with the peace or safety of this state."').
109. Id. at 626.
110. Congdon, 185 A.2d at 23.
111. Id. at 23-24.
112. Id. at 25 (describing this allegation among others).
113. Id. at 29.
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exercise of the state's police power.'14 Supporting the caselaw to date,
the Congdon court methodically dismissed each claim.
First, in finding the civil defense law applicable for training
purposes, the court took judicial notice of "the necessity of
government to plan for the protection of its citizens" and reasoned
that "the intent of the Legislature was not to wait until the community
had been struck by the holocaust ... before civil defense measures
could become effective.", 5
Next, restricting the application of Natelson Brothers only to
times of war, opined the court, "ignores not only the basic policy of
civil defense but also the concern of the Natelson Brothers court with
training, protection and preparedness. . . it is realistic to uphold this
defensive assertion of the police power in peacetime." 6 Finally, after
recognizing the "welfare of the people" as "the supreme law" and
analogizing it to the "law of necessity," the court cited Dean Roscoe
Pound to explain that the drills were in the "exercise [of] the common
good" because "'[1]ife in a civilized society presupposes security from
aggression.""'" This rationale supported New Jersey's exercise of the
police power.
In another portion of Congdon, the court clarified its
reasoning:
A civil defense drill is much more than an enforced
ritual. It is potentially a matter of life and death. As
we have already pointed out, the basis of the State's
police power is the protection of its citizens. This
protection must be granted irrespective of the fact that
certain individuals may not wish to be saved or
protected. Just as the State may require persons to be
vaccinated or to be quarantined, so may it, as here,
take steps to reduce the exposure of the citizens to the
dangers of a possible war, including atomic bomb
radiation.',
While Ducey helped to distinguish the types of risks that
governments are expected to mitigate, Natelson Brothers and
Congdon support the principle that in order for states to fulfill their
114. Id.at28.
115. Id at 26.
116. Id.at21.
117. Id. at 29 (citing Roscoe Pound, Juristic Theory in the Atomic Age, 9 RUTGERS L.
REV. 464, 465 (1954)).
118. Id.at3l.
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duties, even in executing practice drills, their responses to disaster
cannot be impeded by traditional procedural rules. Additionally,
Reitz and Parilli eliminate differences in judicial treatment of real and
hypothetical responses because effectiveness in either response
achieves the same societal objective. The Model Act highlights the
uniform applicability of these precedents throughout the United
States.
The essential nature of principles of self-preservation for the
proper functioning of governments largely provides the basis for the
emergency response regime of any nation, not just that of the United
States." 9 The precedents discussed above highlight the basis for and
necessity of mobilizing resources to plan for threats no one has yet
experienced.
B. International Cooperative Preservation
The rule of self-preservation applies not only at the national
level, but also at the international level. Aspects of the rule appeared
in the early writings of noted jurists such as Hugo Grotius, the "father
of necessity," who explained, "in cases of extreme necessity, the
original right of using things, as if they had remained in common,
must be revived; because in all human laws, and consequently in the
laws relating to property, the case of extreme necessity seems to form
an exception.'
20
Similar sentiments appeared in the writings of Samuel
Pufendorp 2' and John Locke. 22 The principle of self-preservation has
impacted actual court decisions. In the field of maritime law, the
following portion of Sir William Scott's legal opinion in The
"Eleanor" illustrates the legal principle:
It has been said, that even upon the supposition that
119. See Seamone, supra note 10, at 1128 n.184 (discussing various international
constitutions and other related requirements).
120. HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: INCLUDING THE LAW OF NATURE
AND NATIONS § VI, at 92 (A.C. Campbell trans., 1901) (1625).
121. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTo bk. I1, ch. VI, at
118-19 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather, trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (1688) (discussing
the right and privilege of necessity).
122. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. 2, ch. XVI § 183 at 391 (Peter
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ., 1988) (3d ed. 1698) (recognizing the "Fundamental Law of
Nature ... that all, as much as may be, should be preserved [and] if there be not to fully
satisfy both he that hath, and to spare, must remit something of his full Satisfaction, and give
way to the pressing and preferable Title of those, who are in danger to perish without it.").
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this is to be taken as an alien ship, yet whatever may
have been the imprudencies of conduct on the part of
the owner, she would be entitled to the rights of
hospitality if driven into a British port in distress; and
certainly if the distress were real, whether Hall [the
owner of the ship] is a British subject or not, and
whatever may be the character attaching to the ship,
she would be entitled to that benefit. Real and
irresistible distress must be at all times a sufficient
passport for human beings under any such application
of human laws.1
2 3
Burleigh Rodick's in-depth exploration of the law of necessity
summarized the applicable rule of law as follows:
The right to possess those things essential to life
permits a people to pass through the territory of
another state on the ground that necessity revives the
common ownership of property which once existed,
and even gives them the right to reside there, provided
they submit to its territorial laws.'
2 4
These authorities address the necessity of protecting one's
own nation (or crew, in the case of a seafaring vessel) against
imminent harm. While the doctrines may be helpful, they fail to
govern responses to a common threat. Consider, for example, the
recent actions of nations invoking their "right" to self-preservation or
the necessity of closing borders to refugees.'25 The rule that addresses
common threats to all is not merely clothed in self-defense. Rather, it
is the duty of cooperative preservation-the recognition that when
facing threats of a great magnitude which endanger more than one
nation, nations must cooperate in order to fulfill duties to preserve
their own citizens. 126
In Henfield's Case, a decision rendered in 1793, Judge Wilson
explained, in his charge to the grand jury, how the theory might easily
be overlooked:
It seems to have been thought that the law of nations
respects and regulates their conduct only in their
123. The "Eleanor," 165 Eng. Rep. 1058, 1067 (1809).
124. BURLEIGH CUSHING RODICK, THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
3 (1928) (footnotes omitted).
125. This issue has been discussed in great length by Roman Boed, who works as a legal
officer for the United Nations. See generally Boed, supra note 39.
126. For a more detailed explanation, see generally Seamone, supra note 10.
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intercourse with each other. A very important branch
of this law containing the duties which a nation owes
to itself, has in great measure escaped attention. Of a
state, as well as of an individual, self-preservation is a
primary duty .... Under all the obligations due to the
universal society of the human race, the citizens of a
state still continue. To this universal society it is a
duty that each nation should contribute to the welfare,
the perfection and the happiness of the others. If so,
the first degree of this duty is to do no injury .... But
nations are not only prohibited from doing evil, they
are also commanded to do good to one another. On
states as well as individuals the duties of humanity are
strictly incumbent; what each is obliged to perform for
others, from others it is entitled to receive. Hence the
advantages as well as the duty of humanity.'27
In this sense, "even self-preservation typically require[s]
individuals to cooperate."'28
Perhaps the most noteworthy example of cooperative
preservation is the recognition that "the preservation of society from
disease is a fundamental duty of government."' 29  Not only have
countries instituted policies within their own borders, but quarantine
and other measures have "formed part of the interaction between
states from the beginning of the international system."'30 By the mid-
1800s, "the national interest in disease control came to reflect a need
for international cooperation-for attacking the problem
systematically in international relations rather than just nationally
within the state."'' 3' Similar to the civil defense precedent,
governments here needed to prepare before the problem would escape
their control. However, in order to achieve the goal of self-
preservation and reap the benefits of mitigation, in the case of disease
control, unlike civil defense, states had to work in concert.
The driving principle behind states' cooperation-the health
of their own citizens-is, to a great degree, the basis of the
127. Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1107 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793).
128. Phillip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions,
102 YALE L.J. 907, 924 (1993).
129. Paul Slack, Introduction to EPIDEMICS AND IDEAS: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORICAL
PERCEPTION OF PESTILENCE 12 (Terence Ranger & Paul Slack eds., 1992).
130. David P. Fidler, Microbialpolitik: Infectious Diseases and International Relations,
14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1, 18 (1998).
131. Id. at 19.
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precautionary principle underlying many European laws. While
common to all nations, the precautionary principle manifests itself in
different ways in their individual practices because nations each have
"different degrees of accepting risk." 32
Widespread adoption of preventive measures, however, is too
common to be mere coincidence. Currently, the European Union's
reliance on the Maastricht Treaty of 1992111 and documents aiding in
the interpretation of its precautionary principle, such as the
Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle,
published in February 2000,'14 reveal an international consensus
indicative of cooperative preservation. '35 The key element relating to
cooperative preservation requires that nations cooperate in reducing
potential threats in advance of their deleterious effects.'3 6 To date, the
precautionary principle has been applied in the uses of Sulfur Oxide
(SOx), responsive measures to mad-cow disease, and bans on the
import of genetically modified beef.37 In each of these three
scenarios, governments did not wait for conclusive evidence of harm,
but proceeded on the basis of "how much risk.., society can
tolerate."' 3" Actions were uniform because of a cooperative principle
requiring the recognition of reciprocal threats and related objectives.3 "
132. Yasushi Hibi, Precautionary Approach Key to Managing Risks, DAILY YOMIURI
(Tokyo), Nov. 21, 2002, at 17. Even in Japan, where there must first be conclusive scientific
findings, the preventive approach is still generally the accepted method. Id.
133. MAASTRICT TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION 1992 O.J. (C191) I TREATY ON
EUROPEAN UNION, art. 130r (2) (as amended Jan. 1, 1995) [hereinafter MAASTRICHT TREATY].
134. Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, Commission
of the European Communities, COM (2000), Feb. 2, 2000.
135. See, however, infra note 142, for a more comprehensive, global description.
136. See MAASTRICT TREATY, supra note 131, at art. 130r (2) ("Community policy on
the environment .... Shall be based on the precautionary principle and on principles that
preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified
at source .... ).
The power of the principle should not be underestimated given its widespread
adoption notwithstanding its limitations. For example, one observed limitation is ambiguity
in the guidance offered. Lothar Gundling, The Status in International Law of the Principle of
Precautionary Action, 5 INT'L J. ESTUARINE & COASTAL L. 23, 30 (1990). Specifically, "[i]t
is not easy to say what meaning this 'principle' has, given that attempts to take precautions
against one threat may exacerbate dangers from another and without clear understanding of a
threat, it is impossible to know whether precautions are 'cost-effective."' Jeremy Rabkin, Is
EU Policy Eroding the Sovereignty of Non-Member States?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 273, 281 n. 11
(2000). In many cases, there is widespread disappointment that national decisions are made
based upon "logic rather than fact." Michael Fry, Creature of Burble and Froth Stitched Up
in Beef Battle, HERALD (GLASGOW), Dec. 21, 1999, at 15.
137. Hibi, supra note 132, at 17.
138. Id.
139. As recently observed, "[w]hile new as an environmental policy imperative, [the
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Consensus on all types of risk is hardly achieved by the
Maastricht Treaty alone. The recent EC-Hormones arbitration
revealed a clash between European and American approaches to the
genetic modification of food.' 40 However, common actions taken by
governments based on the high magnitude of harm threatened in a
number of cases reveal similarities in precautionary approaches to
environmental harm, even between jurisdictions with conflicting
policies.' 4' African nations, such as Zimbabwe and Zambia, recently
invoked the precautionary principle in rejecting donations of
genetically modified food for feeding their hungry citizens, thereby
further demonstrating the global reach of this notion.12  Thus, while
scholars and courts engage in lengthy debates over the status of the
precautionary principle as customary international law or its binding
nature, 43 the virtual cornucopia of international agreements adopting
the precautionary principle further supports the international salience
of obligations to take preventive and anticipatory action.1'"
precautionary principle] is not new as a human concept." Jutta Brunnee, The Precautionary
Principle and International Law: The Challenge of Implementation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 210,
210 (1997) (book review).
140. WTO, Appellate Body Report on E.C.-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter EC-
Hormones]. This dispute arose from challenges of the United States and Canada to the bases
for the European Community's ban on the importation of beef treated with growth hormones.
For a brief summary, see Sue Ann Mota, The World Trade Organization: An Analysis of
Disputes, 25 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 75, 86-87 (1999).
141. Two such examples would be the American Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411
(2002), and Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (2002), and various state forest management
provisions. Thomas Lundmark, Systematizing Environmental Law on a German Model, 7
DICK. J. ENVTL. L. POL'Y 1, 15 & n.73 (1998) (citing the foregoing provisions as
"comparable American legislation").
142. Tony Hall, An Argument that Keeps Africa Hungry, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Nov. 13,
2002, at 21.
143. Compare, e.g., Alexandre Kiss, The Rights and Interests of Future Generations and
the Precautionary Principle, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION 19, 27 (David Freestone & Ellen Hey eds., 1996)
(opining that the precautionary principle is "the most developed form of the general Rule
imposing an obligation to prevent harm to the environment"), with EC-Hormones, supra
note 140 (rejecting the European Union's position that the precautionary principle is
customary international law and therefore binding on the United States).
144. See, e.g., Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological
Diversity pmbl., para. 4 and art. 11(8) (Jan. 29, 2002), available at http://www.biodiv.org/
doc/legal/cartagena-protocol-en.pdf ("Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant
scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a
living modified organism.., shall not prevent thatParty from taking a-decision... in order
to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects."); Convention for the Protection of the
Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, Apr. 9, 1992, art. 3(2), available at
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/22los.txt ("The Contracting Parties shall apply the
precautionary principle, i.e., to take preventative measures when there is a reason to assume
that substances or energy ... may create hazards.., even when there is no conclusive
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Applying the precautionary principle to unfamiliar types of
disasters, such as those occurring in space, may seem to be a leap
given the absence of similar historical precedents.145 Yet, this appears
so only because of the source of the threat. In relation to its effects,
the same legal principles compelling cooperation in the field of public
health still largely apply. When the Institute of Air and Space Law in
Cologne, Germany, convened a panel to address the environmental
aspects of activities in Outer Space, prominent figures in international
law shared their views on the sources of law that would govern an
international response to threats from Outer Space.' 46  They also
identified several approaches to more exotic harms in space.
47
However, regardless of the specific mitigation measures adopted,
explained Judge Lachs, former President of the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ"), the necessity of legal "principles formulated and
accepted well in advance of potentially dangerous action" was
eminently clear, even though law regarding a specific threat may be
absent. 48  On the issue of natural impact, international law requires
evidence of a causal relationship between inputs and their alleged effects."); U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38 (1992), 1771
U.N.T.S. 108, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849, art. 3(3) ("The Parties should take precautionary
measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its
adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures .... ); Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development (June 14, 1992), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) at Prin. 15 ("Where there are threats
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.");
Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE Region. U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/PC/l0 (1990) at para. 7, 1 YB INT'L ENVTL LAW 429, 431-32 (1990) ("In order
to achieve sustainable development, policies must be based on the precautionary principle.
Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent, and attack the causes of environmental
degradation. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental
degradation."); Final Declaration of the Third International Conference on Protection of the
North Sea, Mar. 7-8, 1990, pmbl., I Y.B. INT'L ENVTL LAW 658, 662-73 (1990). ("[Parties]
will continue to apply the precautionary principle, that is to take action to avoid potentially
damaging impacts of substances that are persistent toxic and liable to bioaccumulate even
when there is no scientific evidence to prove a causal link between emissions and effects.").
145. Planetary Protection (protection of the space environment by limiting activities of
launching states) may be the single area in which such commitment has materialized. See,
e.g., COSPAR, Resolution 26 COSPAR Position with regard to the Florence Report of its
Consultative Group on Potentially Harmful Effects of Space Experiments, art. 5, COSPAR
Information Bull. No. 20, at 26 (1964), available at http://www.cosparhg.org/scistr/
PPPPolicy.htm (addressing prevention of harm to the planetary environment). Alone,
however, the principle relates not to unpredictable naturally occurring threats, but containable
actions on the part of governments conducting space related activities.
146. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS, supra note 19.
147. Id.
148. Manfred Lachs, Customary International Law and General Principles of
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cooperation and intense analysis so that specific rules of conduct may
be developed.
Any effort to address a space threat posed to Earth, including a
large-scale ecological threat, must be global. "[I]t affects the interests
of all states and at the same time cannot be resolved by any country
independently.' ' "9 When such a threat arises, the duty of prevention is
customary international law.150 Cooperation is "not only to sit around
a table and talk but to pursue agreement on some kind of legal
framework where the interests of all parties involved are adequately
balanced." 5'
The legal framework for cooperation that is necessary to
mitigate extreme and unpredicted natural harm, such as natural
impact, is one that will permit planning on several levels
corresponding with the proximity of the threat at the time it is
recognized. In essence, agencies with a responsibility for responding
to harm must be prepared to execute their duties even if there is no
advance warning. On this sliding scale, it becomes clear that different
duties may be present at different times. With no specific and
impending threat identified, an obligation still exists to investigate the
full spectrum of measures and prepare for any level of harm. At a
minimum, channels of communication should be established,
responsive measures developed, and plans standardized across the
international spectrum.
C. Summary of Guidance Offered by Applicable Law
In summary, the functions of domestic and international law
provide the following guidance respecting the requirements of
governments to respond to significant unforeseen harm:
(1) In order to guide mitigation, develop a framework that
spells out particulars with definitions of the meanings of concepts.
Undefined and ambiguous terms alone, such as those common to laws
addressing the global commons--e.g., "common heritage of
mankind," "cooperation," and "warning"-are unacceptable when
addressing responses to the potential for serious harm;
International law, in ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS, supra note 19, at 187, 190.
149. Emil Konstantinov, International Treaties and Ecological Protection from
Activities in Outer Space, in ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS, supra note 19, at 135, 136.
150. Maureen Williams, Customary International Law and General Principles of Law, in
ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS, supra note 19, at 153, 159.
15 1. Id. (emphasis added).
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(2) Practical approaches must pave the way for adequate
warning in the face of an actual threat;
(3) Simulations of the full spectrum of a threat are necessary
to fulfill obligations to respond to its unknown aspects;
(4) Rules established to guide a mitigation effort must have
force and effect despite traditional administrative or procedural
conventions that would stymie prompt and effective mitigation.
IV. LESSONS FROM THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF COOPERATIVE
PRESERVATION
Identifying the applicable theories of law necessary for
effective mitigation of the unknown is only one step toward
accomplishing the goal of adequate preparation. It is just as important
to gain an understanding of how binding principles of law may be
applied in practical settings. This Part identifies examples of
cooperative efforts to mitigate the effects of similarly unpredictable
and widespread harm. They relate to: (1) international biological,
chemical, and nuclear threats; (2) transboundary forest fires; and (3)
the spread of "exotic" infectious diseases across borders. This Part
identifies commonalities in the frameworks adopted to address these
different types of harm, and highlights aspects of the law applied in
the varied settings.
A. TOPOFF, INEX, and CANA TEX: The Operationalized
Approaches to Unexpected Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Disasters
"TOPOFF," which stands for "Top Officials," refers to a
series of simulations of different, simultaneous disasters.'52 The
combined response to such disasters has been hypothesized to
152. As recognized by all implementers of TOPOFF:
[T]he exercise scenario[s], extent and level of damage, and level of threat are
based on a hypothetical situation and are not intended as a forecast of future
terrorist-related events .... The exercise consists of simulated weapons of mass
destruction incidents; there will be no release of any actual agents.
Department of Justice, Press Release, Justice Department, State Department to Conduct
Exercises Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: State and Local Law
Enforcement/Emergency Responders From Illinois, Washington, and Canada to Participate,
Oct. 8, 2002, available at, http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/October/O2-ag_585.htm, at I
[hereinafter TOPOFF Release].
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improve national and international capacities to handle nuclear,
biological, and chemical crises.'53 As is evident from the acronym,
the strategy is not geared toward preparing every citizen for such
events. Rather, the focus of the strategy rests primarily with "[t]op
federal officials, state governors, mayors, city managers," and
secondarily, with first responders.'5 4 Notably, the institution of these
measures grew from an international incident-the intentional release
of sarin gas in a Tokyo subway on March 20, 1995.'11 After
witnessing the death of twelve and the injury of 5000, the U.S.
legislature recognized the transboundary implications of such threats
and mandated the TOPOFF exercises. 51 The express goal was that
the "scenarios will enable top officials and relevant personnel to
practice different courses of action, gain and maintain situational
awareness, as well as to assemble appropriate resources."' 57
Within a matter of years, "TOPOFF 2000" marked the first
attempt to implement the strategy. The exercise, which occurred in
May 2000, involved a single "no-notice" simulation of three
simultaneous terrorist attacks: "[A] bioterrorism attack in Colorado, a
chemical weapons attack in New Hampshire and detonation of a
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See SUPER TERRORISM: BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, AND NUCLEAR (Yonah Alexander &
Milton Hoenig eds., 2001) (describing the circumstances surrounding the event).
156. The 2000 exercise, for example, emerged directly from a Senate Report:
The Committee is aware that numerous exercises are conducted each year to
practice operations in the event of a terrorist incident. The Committee
understands that few of the top officials have ever fully participated in these
exercises. The Committee directs that an exercise be conducted in Fiscal Year
1999 with the participation of all key personnel who would participate in the
consequence management of such an actual terrorist event. The decision on
what type of simulated attack should be based upon the ability to best address
one of these threats.
S. Rep. No. 105-235, at 14 (1999). This mandate arose from the Defense Against Weapons
of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act), which has been revised
numerous times. 50 U.S.C.A. § 2301 (2002). Two key congressional findings led to the
promulgation of requirements for the establishment of readiness measurement mechanisms as
well as consistent reporting on their effectiveness. Finding (23) explains:
The development of, and allocation of responsibilities for, effective
countermeasures to nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical terrorism in
the United States requires well-coordinated participation of many Federal
agencies, and careful planning by the Federal Government and State and local
governments.
Id.
Finding (24) additionally recognizes that "[t]raining and exercises can significantly
improve the preparedness of State and local emergency response personnel for emergencies
involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical weapons or related materials." Id.
157. TOPOFF Release, supra note 152, at 1.
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'dirty' nuclear device in Washington, D.C.11151 In Colorado, for
example, "Denver was hit by an imaginary release of a plague that
quickly became a statewide epidemic."'5 9
In May 2003, TOPOFF 2 will expand to include a more
comprehensive training approach. The newer simulations will "use a
cycle of exercise activity of increasing complexity." They are geared
toward "a limited number of critical crisis and consequence
management objectives" and are based on the lessons learned from
the first exercise.'6 ° The regions represented in TOPOFF 2 will
include Chicago, Seattle, and Canada.'6 ' Inclusion of the international
component is no coincidence. Rather, it results from the recognition
that "events involving weapons of mass destruction near the northern
U.S. Border would have an impact on Canada and require cross-
border coordination. '' 62 The recognition that this intergovernmental
approach is necessary to "significantly improve [the United States's]
ability to respond to a terrorist event" clearly embraces the mandate
of cooperative preservation.163 "It is this cooperation," observed U.S.
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, "that will help defeat terrorism
worldwide."'1'
Similar international efforts have mirrored TOPOFF, although
addressing a more limited spectrum of threats mostly related to
nuclear crises. For example, in a simulated exercise in Finland in
1997:
A light aircraft had crashed into its electricity supply
lines and caused the water pumps for the primary
cooling system to fail, threatening to send one of the
twin 445MW reactors into meltdown and cover the
Baltic states, Poland, Belarus, and large parts of
158. Mike Barber, Drill Will Test Terrorism Response, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Oct. 9, 2002, at B2.
159. Jason Peckenpaugh, Emergency Assistance: It's Up to State Qfficials to Make Uncle
Sam's Complicated Anti-Terrorism Programs Work, Gov'T EXECUTIVE, Nov. 2002, at 18.
160. TOPOFF Release, supra note 152, at 2. These objectives are:
To improve the nation's capacity to manage extreme events; create broader
operating frameworks of expert crisis and consequence management systems;
validate authorities, strategies, plans, policies, procedures, and protocols; and
build a sustainable, systematic national exercise program to support the national
strategy for homeland security.
Id.
161. Id. at I.
162. Id.
163. Id. (quoting U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft).
164. Id.
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eastern Russia with radioactive dust. As if that were
not enough, a gas pipeline had burst and the power
station was in the middle of its annual maintenance
programme. 1
65
As part of a three-year preparedness effort involving twenty-
seven countries, 166 participants in the simulation sought to better
understand "how they exchange information, release it to the media,
and handle potential evacuations" at a multinational level. 167 Among
comparable efforts are the JNEX, 168 CANATEX, 169 and RADEX7°
simulations. The Nuclear Energy Agency ("NEA") of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD")
has coordinated many of these exercises for several nations, on a
recurring basis, to assist in the development of policy for its member
nations.7 Without fail, the simulations have grown in complexity
165. Jon Henley, Finland's Mock Nuclear Meltdown Frays Nerves, GUARDIAN
(LONDON), Apr. 18, 1997, at 21.
166. In fact, while one would expect the participation of nations bordering Finland ("the
Baltic states, Britain, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and
Switzerland"), countries as far from the disaster as "Japan and South Korea [also] monitored
the situation." Id.
167. Id.
168. In 1993, based on several workshops addressing the prevention of harm similar to
Chernobyl, the Nuclear Energy Agency's (NEA) Committee on Radiological Protection and
Public Health instituted the International Nuclear Emergency Exercise (INEX) I as a table-
top simulation for 16 nations to test their responsiveness to a crisis involving fictitious
countries. Introduction to Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
available at http://www.oecdwash.org/PUBS/ELECTRONIC/inexintro.pdf [hereinafter INEX
Introduction]. "The scenario.., allowed countries to play either the country having the
accident, the country adjacent to the accident country, or both." Id. INEX 2 built on these
initial exercises with the objective "to investigate various international aspects of accident
planning, preparedness and management," using exercises in Switzerland, Finland, Hungary,
and Canada from 1996-1998. Id.
169. The acronym CATANEX stands for "Canadian National Exercise," which consists
of a series of exercises "every three to four years" instituted by Emergency Preparedness
Canada. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. EPA Radiological Emergency Response,
available at http://www.epa.gov/radiation/rert/exercises.htm [hereinafter EPA Response].
Similar to TOPOFF, by CANATEX 3, their plans were jointly executed with the United
States. Id. Specific goals included "[t]est[ing] the bilateral arrangements of the Canada-
United States Joint Radiological Emergency Response Plan." Id.
170. The RADEX, or International Radiological Exercise-94, represented the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency's effort to deal with emergencies in Arctic environments,
and involved the participation of the Emergency Response Working Group of the Arctic
Environmental Protection Strategy and others. Id. "The exercise addressed international
concern about the capability of member nations to respond to a radiological emergency
affecting the Arctic." Id. In the simulation, "a fictitious country, Articland, experienced a
release of radioactive materials from a nuclear power plant." Id.
171. See INEX Introduction, supra note 168 (explaining how the INEX exercises led to
the development of further workshops to improve future simulations and develop new
policies for the emergency management regimes in member nations).
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based on various lessons learned at each stage, practically in parallel
strides with the development of the TOPOFF simulations.
B. The Northeastern Compact: International Collaboration to
Prevent the Spread of Transboundary Forest Fires
The Northeastern Compact ("Compact") was promulgated by
certain jurisdictions in both Canada and the United States'72 that share
a common geographic characteristic-abundant forestry.'73 Since the
1800s, the region has faced the unique problem of transboundary
forest fires. 7 4 Similar to efforts in Southeast Asia,'75 each of these
interests recognized the necessity of preventive action, for which
simulations of extreme events have been recognized as an essential
aspect of a sound mitigation effort.
Recognizing the need to preserve local interests in responding
to the threat, the Compact found it more effective to develop its own
responsive infrastructure, joint funding mechanisms,'7 6 and a set of
legally-binding rules to govern warning provisions, priorities of
actions taken, as well as disputes that might arise between members.'77
On a regular basis, the participants join to simulate fires for the
purpose of developing more effective measures.'7 The document
172. Richard E. Mullavey, Training Program Keeps Northeastern Compact Ready, FIRE
MGMT. NOTES, Apr. 1974, at 23 ("Members include Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New York, plus the Canadian Provinces of
Quebec and New Brunswick.").
173. The massive acreage common to the members amounts to 66,047,101. Nicholas A.
Robinson, Forest Fires as Common International Concern: Precedents .for the Progressive
Development of International Environmental Law, 18 PACE ENVTL L. REV. 459, 494 (2001).
174. See id. at 489 (describing circumstances surrounding New York's first system of
local fire wardens in 1885).
175. See ASS'N OF SOUTHEASTERN ASIAN NATIONS, REGIONAL HAZE PLAN (1997),
available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/FireSmokeHaze/appendices.pdf
(describing various preventive measures). Of this combined effort, researchers have
commented on the fact that "the [Association of Southeastern Asian Nations' Specialized
Meteorological Center's] role in providing regional services that none of the states can secure
on their own is truly operational." Robinson, supra note 173, at 481.
176. "Member States and Provinces... pay membership fees based on their share of the
protected area." Robinson, supra note 173, at 494.
177. As such, the Commission serves as a "fact finding, coordinating and deliberative
body with the power to make recommendations to the member states." Rules and
Regulations of the Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Commission, art.l, § 1 (1994),
reprinted in NORTHEASTERN FOREST FIRE PROTECTION (NFFPC), BRIEFING MANUAL 23
(2000) [hereinafter BRIEFING MANUAL].
178. See Richard E. Mullavey, Northeastern Compact Fire Exercise, FIRE MGMT.
NOTES, Jan. 1983, at 24 (explaining the necessity of multiple situational exercises at two
different locations to "meet the needs of all concerned"); Mullavey notes:
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governing the Compact recognizes, as the primary reason for its
existence, the fact that the "fires... might be beyond the capabilities
of a single member."' 79  This basis for action exemplifies the
instrumental role of the duty of cooperative preservation.
C. Combined Approaches to ERIDS: An International Network to
Facilitate Prompt Responses to Unexpected Outbreaks of
"Exotic" Infectious Diseases
While the mid-1800s marked the worldwide recognition of
infectious disease as a matter of international concern, the late 1960s
marked the formalization of a legally-binding international
framework to address the full range of modern threats.' 0  As
recognized by Dr. Ottorino Cosivi of the WHO, while the need for
international cooperation has not changed, the need for improved
response measures has.'"' Of key concern are "exotic" diseases of
which little is known, signifying the need for preventive measures.
Unlike the methodology adopted by the Northeastern Compact or
TOPOFF, which focuses more on mobilization, the combined
approach to emerging and reemerging infectious diseases ("ERIDS")
focuses on the necessity of adequate communication in the
transmission of warnings and the verification of threats.'82
Different mitigation methods have been, adopted for various
aspects of the ERIDS threat, including the following frameworks: the
The mutual aid provisions of the agreement have fortunately been activated
only five times in 25 years [as of 1974]. But the success of these five calls and
the success of potential future calls is based on the training programs instituted
at the very beginning and carried on regularly and successfully ever since.
Mullavey, supra note 172, at 23.
179. BRIEFING MANUAL, supra note 177, at 3.
180. The body of law governing state responses to infections disease is contained in the
International Health Regulations. See generally International Health Regulations, entered
into force Jan. 1, 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 7026 (outlining specific procedures to address multiple
aspects of infectious disease mitigation). These regulations have remained virtually
unchanged "since their most recent adoption in 1969." Ottorino Cosivi, WHO Contribution
to Global Surveillance, Alert and Response to Microbial Threats, Paper Delivered at the
Conference on Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, Instituto Diplomatico Mario Toscano, Villa
Madama, Rome, Italy, Sept. 18-19, 2000 at 4.
181. Cosivi, supra note 180, at 2 ("International cooperation is not new; however,
current global circumstances confronting the control of infectious disease are.").
182. See Richard Cash & Vasant Narasimhan, Impediments to Global Surveillance of
Infectious Disease: Economic and Societal Consequences of Open Reporting, 78 BULL.
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 1358, 1358-60 (2000) (explaining the primary focus on
communications issues).
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International Health Regulations;'" the establishment of regional
offices in regions with unique ERIDS concerns; 8 4  and a
comprehensive Global Outbreak and Response Network.' 5 In order
to determine the effectiveness of the related measures to combat
unknown health concerns, the WHO has practiced transboundary
simulations. "6  The driving force behind these activities is the
recognition that "any upsurge in cases of infectious diseases in a
given country is potentially of concern for the international
community," which signifies the importance of the duty of
cooperative preservation.
D. Common Attributes of Existing Programs to Combat Similarly
Unpredictable International Threats
The above examples offer two lessons that also apply to the
mitigation of all natural disasters of an extreme nature. First, all of
the varied efforts use a unified command structure to some degree,
which houses responsibility for disaster response in a joint
183. These regulations are binding on member states of the World Health Organization
even without their consent when they address certain specified threats to the global
community:
(a) sanitary and quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to
prevent the international spread of disease;
(b) nomenclatures with respect to diseases, causes of death and public health
practices;
(c) standards with respect to diagnostic procedures for international use;
(d) standards with respect to safety, purity and potency of biological and
pharmaceutical and similar products moving in international commerce;
(e) advertising and labeling of biological, pharmaceutical and similar products
moving in international commerce.
World Health Organization Const. art. 21, in WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, BASIC
DOCUMENTS 2 (28th ed. 1978). Commentators have recognized the influence of these
regulations in their expansive reach. Based on the need for uniform regulation of these
calamities, the International Health Regulations remain the "only globally-based,
international legal regime addressing the international transmission of infectious disease."
Bruce Jay Plotkin, Mission Possible. The Future of the International Health Regulations, 10
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 503, 503 (1996).
184. Cosivi, supra note 180, at 3.
185. Id.
186. In the Finnish transboundary simulations addressed supra note 165 and
accompanying text, the World Health Organization's ("WHO's") role was prominent, as it
participated alongside the World Meteorological Organization and the International Atomic
Energy Agency in order to "assess the speed and quality of [its] reactions." Henley, supra
note 165, at 21.
187. Fifty-Fourth World Health Assembly, Global Health Security: Epidemic Alert and
Response, May 21, 2001, Agenda Item 13.3.
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headquarters/nerve center that involves the representation of all
participating nations. When the nerve center cannot develop uniform
policies due to unique issues pertaining to specific regions, it attempts
to provide guidance to aid specific nations in their individual
responses. A characteristic common to each approach is a code of
conduct addressing the responsibilities of each participant and
contingencies for action in the event that anticipated participants are
unable to accomplish their assigned duties.
Second, when simulating the unknown aspects of a threat, the
goal is limited. Since governments cannot anticipate the harm that
will be caused by nature or terrorists in any specific case, responsible
agencies aim to create levels of stress that would likely exist in
responding to simultaneous, unplanned crises. In this recognition,
they observe inadequacies in governmental coordination and improve
responses accordingly. Applied to any extreme natural disaster, the
concern of governments is two-fold: (1) confirming the existence of a
threat; and (2) reacting to it. Governments must seek to simulate both
aspects of all serious natural disasters to develop an effective
response. These simulations are often the only method to provide
guidance because untested guidelines do not sufficiently address
unknown aspects of the harm threatened.
V. ASTEROIDS AS THE TEST CASE FOR UNDERSTANDING THE
RESPONSIBILITIES OF GOVERNMENTS TO MITIGATE EXTREME
NATURAL DISASTERS
The applied approaches offer certain general guidelines for
potential responses to natural disasters. However, without the
existence of an international organization responsible for responding
to all variations of natural disasters, agencies must be given the task
of responding to specific threats. Oftentimes, particular
characteristics of "exotic" threats make it much harder for
governments to mobilize the resources necessary to mount effective
mitigation efforts. Natural impact provides crucial insight into the
obstacles preventing governments from fulfilling their duties because
it reflects common reactions to other extreme, hypothetical crises that
people have never personally experienced.
Varied international reactions to the potential threat of
asteroids and comets striking the Earth demonstrate the dilemma
faced by policymakers. For example, on March 18, 2002, Australian
Minister of Science Peter McGuaran explained why his government
remained steadfast in its 1996 decision not to participate in
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international efforts to search the sky for potential threats: "I'm not
going to be spooked or panicked into spending scarce research dollars
on a fruitless attempt to predict the next asteroid .... I'm just not
convinced that the hype and alarm and even fear-mongering is enough
to justify an 'instant' investment."' 8  Even after reviewing an
unprecedented letter from ninety-one scientists from seventeen
countries urging collaboration on natural impact mitigation,'
McGuaran's decision remained firm.' 90  Although scientists and
governments of many nations are documenting large objects with
orbits close to the Earth and developing better methods of
communication in the event of a confirmed threat, plans to destroy or
deflect an oncoming asteroid or comet, or to respond to an impact
with the Earth, are still in their infancy, as most methods are yet
untested and sometimes even conflicting in their approaches.' 9'
Two key reasons explain the reluctance of governments to
recognize legal obligations to develop an international framework on
natural impact. First, policymakers can easily dismiss calls to action
on the grounds that natural impact is a hypothetical fear, plagued with
unanswerable questions. Second, current policy suffers from a
"source-effects" imbalance in which policymakers overly rely on the
frameworks applicable to the source of the threat-outer space-
rather than the frameworks applicable to the effects of the threat on
188. See Astronomers Left to Watch This Space, CANBERRA TIMES, Mar. 20, 2002, at 15
(citing a portion of the 60 Minutes broadcast) [hereinafter Astronomers]; 60 Minutes (CBS
television broadcast, Mar. 17, 2002).
189. See An Open Letter to the Australian Federal Government from International
Scientists (Jan. 28, 2002), available at http://wwwl.tpgi.com.au/users/tps-seti/pr-oz.sg.htm
(urging participation because, "[w]ithout Spaceguard there would be too little warning to
prevent a disaster"); Simon Grose, Australia Fails World on Asteroids, CANBERRA TIMES,
Feb. 5, 2002, at A5 (explaining the context of the letter).
190. See Astronomers, supra note 188, at 15 ("'I wouldn't like to divert up to five or
more per cent [sic] of that budget towards a fruitless, unnecessary, self-indulgent exercise."').
191. See Seamone, supra note 10, at 1105-08 (describing existing efforts and their
drawbacks); U.K. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 33, Recommendation 9 ("There is
an obvious need for some international forum for discussion of the scientific aspects of the
problem. There is an equally obvious need for a forum of intergovernmental action."). A
report published in 2001 summarized the situation in general:
No discovery programs in Europe and the Southern Hemisphere
Follow-up centers understaffed and still poorly coordinated and funded
Physical characterization very deficient
Lack of studies in social and civil defense domains
International coordination far from satisfactory.
Andrea Carusi, Present and Future of the Spaceguard Survey, in JAPAN SPACEGUARD
ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON COLLABORATION AND COORDINATION AMONG
NEO OBSERVERS AND ORBITAL COMPUTERS 59, 64 (Syuzo Isobe & Yoshifusa Asakura eds.,
Oct. 23-26, 2001).
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Earth's population.
A. The Impossible Questions Raised by Natural Impact
Mitigation
Natural impact is a "hypothetical fear," similar to "biological
and chemical warfare, mad-cow disease, suitcase bombs, terrorists,
radiation, and foreign viruses."'92 Although each of these fears raises
an infinite number of concerns, they generally fall within two
categories of impossible questions that could easily lead one to accept
ignorance of the harm as a viable policy option. First, it is unclear
whether a significant threat will occur in the near future, thereby
prompting concerns such as: "How can we mitigate a threat we can't
simulate"; and "[w]ith hunger, poverty, terrorism, and health concerns
facing the global community today, why prioritize this threat."
Second, assuming there is a threat, doubts arise regarding the
government's ability to respond adequately: "Won't a mitigation plan
create public panic that will undercut the plan's effectiveness?" and
"[a]fter natural impact, won't morale problems, e.g., distrust of the
government for failing to keep people safe, make reconstruction
impossible."'' 93 Similar concerns have led some to promote the policy
position that governments intentionally withhold information of a
known asteroid or comet threat if there is no way to intercept the
object.194
These questions, however, are not unique to natural impact.
Without recognizing duties to act, international policymakers might
have ignored forest fires, bioterrorism, and the threat of unknown
infectious diseases because it is impossible to answer the same exact
concerns definitively.' 9  Despite identical dilemmas, however,
192. Chauncey Starr, Hypothetical Fears and Quantitative Risk Analysis, 21 RISK
ANALYSIS 803, 804 (2001).
193. See HERMAN KAHN, ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR 641-51 (1960) (recognizing
practically identical concerns in the nuclear context). Leo A. Hoegh, the former Director of
the U.S. Office of Civil Defense and Mobilization initially recognized the two categories of
impossible questions when faced with planning for nuclear war. "It's true that we're fighting
two obstacles," he commented. "One, the feeling that 'it can't happen here.' That's a
mistake .... And secondly, there's the attitude that if it did happen you couldn't do anything
about it. This is wrong." H-Bomb Survival: What Can We Do?, TODAY'S HEALTH, Jan.
1959, at 36.
194. Don't Tell Public of Doomsday Asteroid, TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 15, 2003, at 9 ("It
makes sense to warn if there's something you can do but if you can't intercept it, if you can't
move people out of its way, it makes sense not to occasion further social costs") (comments
of Rand Corporation Policy Analyst Geoffrey Sommer).
195. Oftentimes, attempts to provide answers will be treated suspiciously because these
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governments have articulated legally binding standards, which
emphasize the feasibility of developing a similar regime to address
natural impact. In a clear and unified voice, these collaborative
efforts emphasize an important point: while familiarity may breed
contempt, planners dealing with the potential for widespread harm
cannot "let unfamiliarity breed neglect."'' 96  Existing international
measures overcome classic criticisms that nations are merely reacting
to over-exaggerated fears championed by political interest groups.
B. Over-reliance on Sources Rather Than Effects
It is no shock that the primary focus of the United Nations, in
shaping a natural impact mitigation strategy, is space-the source of
the natural impact threat. Consequently, it is the law of outer space
that dominates the U.N.'s policy and legal parameters. In July 1999,
the U.N. Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space adopted three key declarations addressing natural impacts
within its "nucleus of a strategy to address global challenges in the
future":
(1) To improve the scientific knowledge of near and
outer space by promoting cooperative activities in such
areas as astronomy, space biology and medicine, space
physics, the study of near-Earth objects and planetary
threats are so exotic, suggesting that it is far better to admit that certain questions simply
cannot be answered definitively. Because these are extreme events with which the public is
unfamiliar, there is a real potential that exaggeration of a threat can lead to bad policy
decisions. See Starr, supra note 192, at 804 ("If any alternative is too heavily weighted by
hypothetical public fears, the decision response may be unwittingly flawed with serious
consequences.").
The "giggle factor" marks the common reaction of policymakers considering the
notion of planetary defense. France, supra note 10, at 1. "One is tempted to laugh, or at least
smile, at such prophecies. Perhaps by disbelieving them we can prevent them from coming
true." Ben Bova, Introduction to GERRIT t. VERSCHUUR, COSMIC CATASTROPHES vii, ix-x
(1978). Along with the instinctual chuckle at the notion in general, there is a negative
connotations of being involved "in a program that may never be used during a human
lifetime." France, supra note 10, at I. This reaction may stem from the difficulty of
visualizing a space phenomenon. When approaching the issue of asteroids or comets on a
collision course with Earth, naturally, these analogies invoke comparisons to "invisibility,
interstellar travel, immortality, visits from alien beings, travel through time, weather control,
mental telepathy, and many other wonders that seem unlikely if not downright impossible."
Bova, supra, at viii. Accordingly, by comparing natural impact to the death of the Sun or
some other cosmic crisis far beyond our control, it becomes very easy to ignore the threat on
the basis that we cannot effectively prepare to overcome it.
196. Richard Danzig & Pamela B. Berkowsky, Why Should We Be Concerned About
Biological Warfare?, in BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: LIMITING THE THREAT 9, 12 (Joshua
Lederberg ed., 1999).
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exploration; 97
(2) [t]o improve the international coordination of
activities related to near-Earth objects, harmonizing
the worldwide efforts directed at identification, follow-
up observation and orbit prediction, while at the same
time giving consideration to developing a common
strategy that would include future activities related to
near-Earth objects; and 98
(3) [t]o protect the near and outer space environments
through further research on designs, safety measures
and procedures associated with the use of nuclear
power sources in outer space."9
The logic underlying these resolutions has been identified in
great part by Dr. John Remo, Chair of the U.N. Conference on Near
Earth Objects. He has noted the general consensus that there is no
law specifically governing natural impact mitigation200 and that it
would naturally be within the domain of organizations dealing with
space issues to develop an international policy on the issue.'O
At first glance, it may seem logical that the drafters of policy
are adopting an approach that compares natural impact with other
types of harm in outer space addressed by existing treaties, such as
the Outer Space Treaty's provisions on cooperation or notification in
the face of danger.0 2 Space law, after all, offers the benefit of the
197. Report of the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space. Vienna, July 19-30 1999, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.184/6, Resolution I.l.c.i
[hereinafter Third Conference].
198. Id. at Res. I.l.c.iii.
199. Id. at Res. 1.l.c.iv.
200. John L. Remo, Policy Perspectives from the UN International Conference on Near-
Earth Objects, 12 SPACE POL'Y 13, app. at 17 (1996) ("International law and practice does
not address this issue directly."); see also U.K. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 33
("There are no obvious precedents .... ").
201. John L. Remo, Preliminary Report on Policy Issues and Research
Recommendations of the United Nations International Conference on Near-Earth Objects
(NEOs) (undated) available at http://www.llnl.gov/planetary/pdfs/Integration/06-Remo.pdf
(citing as the "singular reason" for the Committee to address this issue its continuing
involvement in the development of Outer Space law).
202. See Remo, supra note 200, app. at 17, ("[W]ithin the U.N. Charter major
international agreements that form the basis for international space law already contain some
principles and norms that could be interpreted to provide limited guidance."). Projected as
being compatible with natural impact are: "[A]rrangements ... already in place for certain
emergencies such as those associated with communication and reconnaissance satellites," id.
at 16, and various provisions of the Outer Space Treaty relating to the "protection of human
life from an extraterrestrial agent." Id. app. at 17. See also Seamone, supra note 10, at
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"overview effect"-the notion that "[f]rom the perspective of space,
we are unable to see the arbitrary borders that separate nations and we
become keenly aware of a single delicate ecosystem."20 3
The drawback of using the source-based approach is that
space law principles are largely undefined, undeveloped, and
untested. 0 4 Even the fundamental bases underlying the Outer Space
Treaty have been questioned in modem times. In adopting these
undeveloped principles, natural impact mitigation inherits precisely
the same dilemmas. 06  These principles are also ill-suited to address
harm to the Earth because of their inherent tendency to shift concern
away from the effects of a space phenomenon on human life.2"7
Consequently, the effects of natural impacts on the Earth's
populations often have been viewed as merely tangential issues.
Mitigation becomes one-dimensional, leaving the human dimension
of how the threat relates to Earth-based populations for some other
day, time, and place. While it is possible to view this disconnect
between space policy and human rights as a traditional characteristic
of space law, it is equally feasible to interpret the same as a
1132-34 (addressing various outer space provisions).
203. Michael Allen Potter, Human Rights in the Space Age: An International and Legal
PoliticalAnalysis, 4 J.L. & TECH. 59, 63 (1989); ef id at 74 ("One of the luxuries afforded to
space law is that it allows for law to guide events, as contrasted to the situation on Earth
where law often lags behind."). Space law, cannot, however, be the exclusive approach.
204. Regarding mitigation of threats from space, "neither the Outer Space Treaty nor any
other space agreements provide a more detailed definition of [necessary] preventive
measures. Quite often this has been described as the main shortcoming of codified space
law." Reifarth, supra note 19, at 302. For example, "[d]efinitions are lacking for such terms
as 'international regime,' 'common heritage of mankind' and 'international scientific
preserves."' Galloway, supra note 19, at 98. As a result, little can be done to expand on
these phrases in new instruments except "repeat[ing] provisions of international law which
are self-evident." Reifarth, supra note 19, at 302.
205. See, e.g., Lawrence Risley, An Examination of the Need to Amend Outer Space Law
to Protect the Private Explorer in Outer Space, 26 W. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 48 (1998)
(expressing the sentiments of investors and private explorers that many of the crucial
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty should be disregarded: "It is not clear that the United
Nations is or should be the governing body for activities in outer space.").
206. Despite the existence of provisions that only need to be extended to address the
natural impact threat, comparable regimes involving some effect on human life are riddled
with their own sets of conflicts, which may complicate further the ability to mobilize efforts
in natural impact mitigation. See discussion supra note 204; see also Potter, supra note 203,
at 68 (discussing dilemmas related to remote sensing and the rights of nations).
207. Potter, supra note 203, at 63-64.
208. Many observe that space in an inherently risky place where considerations of
human rights will evolve in time when the risk is contained. George S. Robinson, Astrolaw:
Carrying Human Rights into Outer Space, FUTURIST, May 1990, at 60:
Nowhere, in all of these domestic laws and international treaties, is there a
definitive embracing of human rights and freedoms in space. Nowhere is the
'spacelaw' or 'astrolaw' guardianship role of these rights and freedoms
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violation of the rights of people who are potentially at risk of
significant harm due to governmental inaction. After all, people have
rights in times of disaster,29 and decisions affecting future generations
have legal priority.20
The clearest example of the source-effects imbalance is
evident in the development of policies that completely ignore post-
impact mitigation measures, a view evident in a preliminary report
identifying four "[s]teps towards mitigation... in the order of
priority.' The report takes absolutely no consideration of post-
impact response measures. In seeking to mitigate the full spectrum of
the natural impact threat, policymakers must use well-established,
Earth-based precedents that are more developed than outer space law.
specifically stated. And nowhere in this new body of law is there a clear
recognition of the need for principles of social order in a truly unique physical
and psychological environment.
C Potter, supra note 203, at 62 n.3, citing CARL Q. CHRISTOL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN OUTER
SPACE I (Am. Inst. Of Aeronautics and Astronautics ("AIAA") Paper No. 68-910, 1968)
(predicting that the simultaneous development of the law of space with recognition of
international human rights is "not purely coincidental" and that they are "interrelated aspects
of a common plane"). As a result of this limited development, it is expected that
policymakers addressing human rights aspects of outer space phenomena will inevitably face
"enormous challenges." Id. at 74. However, policymakers addressing natural impact cannot
wait for this day to arrive. Since the threat can cause harm to populations on Earth, a feasible
approach must be recognized today.
209. Aside from the right to governmental protection under the theory of self-
preservation, individuals are entitled to certain essential human rights. See JAIME ORAA,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 272 (1992) (recognizing
"precise limits on States' derogations from human rights standards in situations of
emergency," which exist "not only in treaty law but also according to general international
law").
210. E.g., Michael B. Gerrard, Risks of Hazardous Waste Sites versus Asteroid and
Comet Impacts: Accounting for the Discrepancies in U.S. Resource Allocation, 19 RISK
ANALYSIS 895, 895 (2000) (explaining how natural impact is similar to existing requirements
that command a preventive response by governments because, in these instances, "they
are.., ultimately concerned about managing intergenerational risk"). See also generally
EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON
PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1988) (justifying the importance of this
requirement from a legal perspective).
211. Remo, supra note 201, at 4:
Steps towards mitigation should focus on, in the order of priority:
A vigorous NEO sky search with adequate follow-up for objects of special
significance.
Laboratory experiments on surrogate NEO materials emphasizing special
observables (especially for comet-like materials) and their response to
mechanical and radiative interactions.
Development of long range rockets to carry out flyby, orbital, and penetrator
reconnaissance missions.
Maintenance of the scientific and technological capabilities of the academic and
industrial bases and the research and development laboratories.
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Without this integration of source- and effects-based frameworks,
nations in their collaborative approaches will fail to recognize a
crucial point: there is binding law that applies to disaster mitigation,
regardless of its source.
To better evaluate the implications of existing international
natural impact provisions, suppose for a moment that the three
resolutions of the U.N. Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space were adopted by all nations as binding in
determining the scope of their obligations to cooperate. Next,
suppose that a single additional resolution accompanied the previous
three:
Recognizing the potential of near-Earth objects
("NEO") to destroy biodiversity, it is hereby resolved
that research efforts to mitigate NEO threats include
current options to mitigate general threats to
biodiversity, each of which create similarly
devastating effects on the natural environment, such as
deforestation.
Simply considering policies that apply to harms on Earth
would dramatically change policy priorities. Experts in
environmental law have explained that the mere recognition of the
common threats posed by assaults on biodiversity compel certain
duties to cooperate in the mitigation of transboundary harm.2 2 Setting
aside such specific duties, consider instead the many different
additional experts, whose participation in global policy formation
regarding natural impact mitigation would be required. Absent the
reference to a potential loss of biodiversity, disaster response
strategists and experts who deal with human, Earth-based approaches
to hazard mitigation would be, and unfortunately are, absent from
global mitigation efforts.
An example of this discrepancy in U.S. law has been noted by
Professor Michael Gerrard. He points out that although polluted
landfills pose a less significant threat than do natural impacts, entirely
different bodies of personnel with entirely different objectives shape
212. Many stress the importance of Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development of 1992: "States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to
conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem." U.N. ENV'T
PROGRAMME, Rio DECLARATION ON ENV'T & DEV., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26, Annex 1,
U.N. Sales No. E.73.11.A.14 (1972), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/confl5l/
aconf1 5126-1 annex l.htm. The Principle represents the following notion: "Given the
interdependence of the natural systems of the biosphere it is normal that the states seek to
cooperate on common matters of environmental protection." Robinson, supra note 173, at
469.
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the laws addressing mitigation of related harms because one type of
ecological crisis originates on Earth and the other in space:
There is almost no overlap in the people studying [the
risks of environmental pollution addressed by the
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act and the risks of
natural impact] or the officials regulating them. They
do not compete for funding or attention. Completely
different disciplines and institutions care about them.",
The remedy to the source-effects imbalance facing natural
impact and other exotic natural harms is hardly as simple as the
compelled inclusion of Earth-based disaster planners. Striking the
appropriate balance requires adherence to the established principles of
self-preservation and consideration of the full range of options
available to mitigate natural threats. In terms of how a balance may
be struck, the next Part relates an important lesson the U.S.
government learned during the civil defense era.
C. Determining How to Distinguish Between Prudent and
Preposterous Plans: Lessons from the American Civil Defense
Experience
Even if binding law applies to disaster mitigation regardless of
the source of the disaster, the bare mandate to include effects-based
planning only skims the surface of an optimal solution. It offers no
regulatory mechanism to strike a proper balance between source- and
effects-based strategies. This dilemma poses numerous questions
similar to those encountered in the regulation of toxic substances,
greenhouse gasses, and the nuclear industry. "How safe is safe
enough?" "When [will our] efforts go[] far enough?" "How far
should we reduce the uncertainties before beginning to reduce the
risk?"24 If the international community cannot move beyond these
inquiries, little will be accomplished, given the imprecision inherent
in the task. An important historic lesson from the American civil
defense experience provides significant insight into the regulatory
mechanism that will yield an optimal allocation of source and effects
emphasis, especially in post-disaster planning.
On September 15, 1961, President Kennedy addressed the
213. Gerrard, supra note 210, at 895.
214. JOSEPH G. MORONE & EDWARD 1. WOODHOUSE, AVERTING CATASTROPHE:
STRATEGIES FOR REGULATING RISKY TECHNOLOGIES 55, 152 (1986).
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public in an open letter published in Life Magazine.2 5 The letter
introduced an article entitled, Fallout Shelters. You Could Be Among
the 97% to Survive, and urged citizens to participate in the national
effort to build and use fallout shelters, store food, and participate in
civil defense programs.2 6 While this showing of support for civil
defense was sparked mainly by various policies promoting national
solidarity, relevant aspects of the nuclear threat relate to a
government's ability to "evacuate a high percentage of its urban
population to protection."2 7 In the context of extreme natural disaster
mitigation, while it is not a rival state that nations must deal with, but
rather nature itself, the necessity of evacuation for the sake of survival
again arises. Thus, certain aspects of the civil defense experience can
inform current natural impact mitigation efforts.
In his monumental work, On Thermonuclear War, Dr.
Herman Kahn incorporated into mainstream notions the idea that
Americans should be "thinking about the unthinkable" and be
prepared for a significant nuclear attack."8  Initially, these
perspectives fostered so much optimism that, at least for a short time,
it was envisioned that Americans would execute emergency
evacuation drills "two or three times every decade. 21 9
These plans, however, terminated rather quickly. In
December 1961, the Kennedy administration initially allocated $695
million in expenditures to civil defense, but the final commitment
approved by Congress in the summer of 1962 was only $80 million,
"with scarcely a gesture of protest or dismay. 22 ° What caused this
rapid decline in civil defense planning also applies to natural impact.
Simply put, there was no mechanism to determine how feasible or
extensive any mitigation approach should be. No formulae existed to
determine whether a plan was prudent or preposterous. While the
minimalist approach favored educational efforts and limited mock
exercises, extreme sentiments such as those expressed by Dr. Edward
Teller, the creator of the hydrogen bomb, dealt a severe and numbing
blow:
First we will start with fallout shelters, he explained,
but that won't cover everybody. So we will have to go
215. LIFE, Sept. 15, 1961, at 95 (reprinting Executive letter dated Sept. 7, 1961).
216. Id.
217. FRED KAPLAN, THE WIZARDS OF ARMAGEDDON 225 (1983) [hereinafter WIZARDS].
218. J. RONALD OAKLEY, GOD'S COUNTY: AMERICA IN THE FIFTIES 367 (1986).
219. WIZARDS, supra note 217, at 225.
220. Id. at 314.
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to blast shelters. But that won't cover everybody,
either, so finally we will have to build fire shelters.
And if the Russians build bigger bombs, then we will
have to dig deeper.
22'
Without a means to determine optimal approaches, civil
defense became the "number one political headache" of the Kennedy
administration. 222 "Everywhere the shelter program seem[ed] to be
emerging as the chief issue of domestic concern-and as one
surrounded by an alarming amount of bewilderment, confusion, and,
in some cases (both pro and con) of near hysteria. 223  In one
noteworthy case, Father L.C. McHugh, a Georgetown professor of
religious ethics, attempted to use "relevant principles [that] were the
common property of the Catholic moralists long before Hiroshima" to
support the "mount[ing] of a machine gun at [one's] shelter in order
to keep unwelcome strangers out" or those "ready to evict unbidden
guests with tear gas if any such occupied [their] shelter before [their]
family did.,
2 4
While science supported various mitigation scenarios, most
policymakers focused on the source of the harm with little focus on
effect. The draft of the pamphlet instructing citizens on response
measures, Fallout Protection: What to Know About Nuclear Attack-
What to Do About It, which was to be distributed nationally, accepted
broad notions of mitigation without further clarification:
One section title in the pamphlet read, Shelter Living
Will Be As Healthy As You Make It. The vision of
everyone coming out of their shelters and returning to
previous circumstances-"The communities that are
well organized and have planned their decontamination
actions will be able to return to normal conditions"-
struck most officials as "too facile." There was
nothing about the uncertainties and difficulties
involved in decontamination, nothing that suggested
that hospitals, doctors and nurses might no longer exist
in abundance, no justification for the assumption that
everyone can come out of his shelter after two weeks,
no references to biological hazards of consuming fresh
221. Id. at 313.
222. Id. at 312 (citing letter from Ted Sorensen to President John F. Kennedy, Nov. 23,
1961).
223. Id. (citing letter from Arthur Schlesinger to President John F. Kennedy).
224. L.C. McHugh, Ethics at the Shelter Doorway, AMERICA, Sept. 30, 1961, at 824.
20031
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W
milk or foodstuffs that might be contaminated, no
details about safe levels of radiation dosage or the area
of damage that would be most endangered by blast of
fire or fallout, given different sizes of nuclear
explosives that might be involved in Soviet attack.225
This lack of focus on effect flowed naturally from a key policy
flaw: seven factors, considered by Herman Kahn to be essential for all
recovery measures to work, were presented but never fully explored
121
or applied in a practical sense.
In approaching a nuclear holocaust, natural impact, or any
major societal disaster, the need to satisfy assumptions, similar to
Kahn's seven, presented below, must drive policy decisions:
2
1
Favorable political environment-no one seriously
interferes with the reconstruction effort.226
Immediate survival and patch-up-where necessary,
the debris is cleared, and basic necessities, such as
communications, urgent repairs, credits and markets, a
transportation system, and utilities are set up or
restored.
29
Maintenance of economic momentum-"the economy
does not stop, that the resources for survival and
recuperation are produced. This requires the
establishment of markets and the furnishing of labor
forces, credits, and management. In addition to the use
of direct allocations and priorities, financial measures
may be crucial here .... Almost as important to the
encouragement of useful activities is the
discouragement of wasteful and unimportant ones."""
Specific bottlenecks resolved-"not any specific
resource constraints which determine the gross
225. WIZARDS, supra note 217, at 311.
226. Id. at 229 (explaining how "none of the assumptions were subject to [thorough]
analysis [and how they were, instead,] all held on faith").
227. Id. The crucial nature of these assumptions has been emphasized. "If any of these
assumptions didn't hold in the real world all of Kahn's bets were off." Id. On Earth, after
any global catastrophe, these same assumptions arguably hold true.
228. KAHN, supra note 193, at 84.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 87.
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output.., ten, and fifteen years [out].
23'
"Bourgeois" virtues survive-"people will be willing
to work at reconstructing the country and would have
productivity at this task about equal to that of their
pre[-crisis] work." '232
Workable post-crisis standards adopted-adopt
workable post-crisis health and safety standards that
are acceptable from both the individual and political
point of view.233
Neglected effects unimportant-the economic and
societal costs of dealing with other post-crisis
problems, such as related environmental crises will not
be overwhelming.234
In the context of natural impact, only after exploring common
issues that apply equally at all levels of the mitigation process (for
example, detection and evacuation alike) can we properly determine
which measures are prudent and which measures are draining on other
public health resources-a major objective recognized in the planning
literature.35
In summary, these lessons suggest that nations participating in
natural impact mitigation and mitigation of similar types of exotic
natural disasters must seek to identify tradeoffs between legal and
policy doctrine that relate to both the source of the problem they are
trying to mitigate and the effects of the harm. Striking this balance
does not mean ignoring crucial space policies. In fact, drawing on
existing rules can help direct activities in the threat detection phase of
mitigation. Policy related to space may support both providing
advance notice of harm to others or the U.N. Secretary General236 and
231. Id. at 87-88.
232. Id. at 89.
233. Id. at 84, 90.
234. Id. at 90-91.
235. See generally Starr, supra note 192 (discussing the potential for wasteful allocations
of resources based on exaggerated hypothetical fears).
236. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, art. V, 18
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967) ("States Parties to the
Treaty shall immediately inform other States Parties to the Treaty or the Secretary-General of
the United Nations of any Phenomena they discover in Outer Space ... which could
constitute a danger to the life or health of astronauts.").
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assisting potential victims of harm revealed by remote sensing.
23 7
However, the simultaneous consideration of frameworks applicable to
threats occurring on Earth, such as lessons from the International
Decade on Disaster238 and applications of the doctrine of necessity in
international settings,23 permits policymakers to address other
difficult issues. Ethical dilemmas that may be addressed with the
balanced approach include: warning nations that are simultaneously at
risk; different cultures' varying perceptions of serious risks;2 4" and the
evacuation of potential victims of natural impact.
While it will clearly take more time and effort to produce an
acceptable set of objectives to guide the prioritization of source-
effects-balanced alternatives, risk analysts have identified other areas
that require a similar "value"-driven approach.24' Their research
stresses the importance of "careful thinking about what we want...
policies to achieve" in conjunction with such objec . 242 Mpolcie t a iee" j i chobjectives. any of
the resultant policies developed to aid in natural impact mitigation
will apply to similar types of natural harm.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The following three recommendations should assist
governments in directing international efforts to mitigate natural
impacts and other unpredictable, extreme transboundary harm.
237. Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, G.A. Res.
41/65, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Prin. 11 (1986).
238. See, e.g., International Decade.for Natural Disaster Reduction, G.A. Res. 51/185,
51 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 170, U.N. Doe. A/51/49 (Vol. 1) (1996) (confirming the
importance of the Decade in the development of international policy); Yokohama Strategy
and Plan of Action for a Safrr World, available at http://www.unisdr.org/unisdr/
resyokohama.htm (further establishing various principles in greater detail).
239. See supra Part II1.B (discussing the doctrine of necessity in international law).
240. See, e.g., Gerrard & Remo, supra note 30, at 117 ("Still greater difficulties will
arise [in mounting an international response to asteroid or comet impact] if some religion,
especially one that controls a national government, comes to believe that the NEO expresses
the Will of God, and that efforts to stop it are heretical."). See generally VERSCHUUR, supra
note 195 (speculating how nations might react to various types of cosmic catastrophe, and
predicting the rise of religious sects in response to notification of potential space threats).
241. See generally Ralph L. Keeney & Timothy L. McDaniels, A Framework to
Thinking and Analysis Regarding Climate Change Policies, 21 RISK ANALYSIS 989 (2001).
242. Id. at 989.
[41:735
MITIGATING EXTREME NATURAL THREATS
A. Recommendation One: The Multilateral Framework
Nations should adopt an organizational approach that extends
beyond the confines of the United Nations framework for outer space
or outer space law. Furthermore, nations should issue binding
regulations and policy guidance through a single nerve center
composed of international representatives; however, they should also
encourage regions with unique and individual geographic and socio-
political characteristics to work out specific details in bilateral or
limited multilateral agreements.
Natural impact mitigation, as well as the mitigation of similar
types of natural harm, requires an individualized and concerted effort
to enable quick decision making. Traditional, deliberative, and time-
consuming approaches increase opportunities for further damage. In
responding to the question of who can fashion the rules governing
such an organization, former U.S. Ambassador Harlan Cleveland's
answer is apropos:
It has to be a club that credibly speaks for 'all
mankind' .... The club that takes on such a
responsibility has to be of manageable size, yet it must
also represent the people who can do something about
the problems .... If they don't agree on what's to be
done, it won't get done. The important thing is not to
debate blame but to organize remedies.243
A key aspect necessary to meet this requirement is the
"unified command" model of governance, in which "each
[a]gency ... at each level of government that has a role in responding
to major ... events will have a representative on [the decision-making
panel].'44 The model permits the creation of "a common and
consistent action plan to make the best possible uses of all
resources.
245
In contemplating the numerous responsibilities involved in an
optimal mitigation approach, consider Figure 1.
243. Harlan Cleveland, The Global Commons: Management of the Use of Oceans,
Weather, Antarctica and Outer Space, FUTURIST, May-June 1993, at 12.
244. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES, NUCLEAR
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While the approacn must be interdisciplinary, involving scientists,
disaster response personnel, and lawyers, the framework developed
must permit all members to determine which agencies have primary
and alternate responsibility for specific actions. Policymakers
246. For a similar organizational diagram, see CALIFORNIA TERRORISM PLAN, supra note
244, at 16.
247. E.g., Third Conference, supra note 197, at Res. I.l.c.i (calling for experts of various
backgrounds to address this issue); Chapman et al., supra note 12, at 15 (calling for a
"broader segment" of experts to address this issue); France, supra note 10, at 10,
Recommendation 7 ("FEMA should be directed to include asteroid and cometary impacts in
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should respond to the following questions in developing common
action plans:
(1) Who will determine whether a threat exists;
(2) who will decide on the course of action;
(3) who will direct the mission and determine when
mission changes are to be made; and
(4) who will determine whether the mission was
successful?
2 4
In responding, policymakers must seek to avoid the situation
where "leadership roles and the roles of authorities in the crisis [are]
uncertain., 249  For example, while a military agency may be the
ultimate decision-maker in the case of specific defensive measures
against an oncoming asteroid or comet, it may not be expected to
have the final authority on evacuation measures. Likewise, those
directing evacuations should not be overburdened with verifying the
initial threat.
In response to binding obligations, nations should not
underestimate either trust-building measures or their ultimate link to
effective communication between diverse parties. One measure that
has been instituted in disease surveillance policy is the
implementation of Web sites that depend on members of the public to
alert the medical community about disease outbreaks, even before
they have been confirmed through appropriate verifying authorities.25
their planning, as well as nominating a representative to serve as liaison to the Air Force
Space Command organization responsible for NEO detection, tracking, and mitigation."); id.
at Recommendation I (explaining the need for the President to direct the Secretary of
Defense to include asteroid and comet impact mitigation within the mission of the Air
Force's Space Command).
248. Worden, supra note 13, at 5.
249. Thomas V. Inglesby et al., A Plague on Your City: Observations from TOPOFF, 32
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 436, 439 (Donald A. Henderson et al. eds., 2001). Such was
the case in TOPOFF 2000, when, even armed with dozens of policy manuals, "the FBI was
operating from the assumption that the state Attorney General's Office was the organization
with highest authority because this is the ranking state office to which the FBI reports in a
crisis." Id. This experience provides a clear indication of the need for detailed descriptions
of actions to guide planning and response efforts. They must know where their duties end
and their role in the overall functioning of the command structure.
250. See Mark W. Zacher, Global Epidemiological Surveillance: International
Cooperation to Monitor In/ectious Diseases, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 266, 276-77 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999) (describing the
launching of the ProMed-mail and Canada's Global Public Health Information Network
rumor pages).
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This measure increases the willingness of nations to cooperate in
reporting because it will be more difficult to conceal a true
outbreak."' As applied to natural impacts, existing websites, which
enable astronomers to alert authorities and the public to potentially
harmful impactors, should quell fears that individual nations would
withhold vital information about a potential threat. Promotion of
these measures and increased public awareness would increase the
adherence of all participants to a regulatory framework addressing
notification.
The facilitation of communication between diverse actors also
aids in clarifying the limits of their individual responsibilities. One
example can be found in the broadly accepted notion that conference
calls will provide multiple nations with quick access to key decision
makers. At the TOPOFF exercises, the experience of the participants
proved this notion to be false. "[T]he process of decision-making by
conference call was highly inefficient and led to indecision and
significant delays in the taking of action." '252 As applied to natural
impact, this flaw would cost many lives. Channels of communication
cannot create an environment where the "identities of those
participating in the calls, as well as the leadership of and agendas for
the calls, [a]re unclear." '253 These lessons stress the importance of
having a communications structure that permits key decision makers
254to meet face-to-face during a natural impact crisis. For instance,
Emergency Management Australia ("EMA"), when dealing with the
Mir Crisis, relied on this policy to clarify roles between the Mir
Mission Control Center and its government:
A central objective identified during initial planning
was to place an Australian liaison officer in the Mir
Mission Control Centre (MCC) outside Moscow. At
the time this idea was first mooted, it was perceived by
many as an admirable but far-fetched proposition.
Fortunately, this proved not to be the case, with an
Australian representative present in the MCC and in
telephone contact with EMA throughout the re-entry.
251. Id. (explaining how this "new level of transparency on outbreaks has encouraged
states to be more honest about their medical crises").
252. Inglesby et al., supra note 249, at 439.
253. Id.
254. See France, supra note 10, at Recommend. 4 ("Liaisons from interested foreign
nations should be invited to participate in the program, and be located [at] Air Force Space
Command Headquarters, to ensure integration of their nation's contributions into the overall
effort. Supporting nations should have representatives on the planning and operational staffs
much as Canadian Officers now serve on the NORAD staff.").
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This representative showed extreme dedication in
ensuring the passage of real-time information to the
National Emergency Management Coordination
Centre in Canberra. This enabled all Australian
stakeholders to be apprised of developments as they
occurred which was vital to EMA's ability to rapidly
pass information to those who sought it, particularly
the media.255
To make communication effective, further precautions are
necessary. The exercises of the Northeastern Compact reveal that
communication channels must account for language differences.256
Even terminology unique to particular fields must be addressed when
taking joint action.2"7 Without these clarifications laced into the fabric
of a code of conduct, individuals and agencies will be forced to make
separate and incompatible decisions rendering joint action ineffective.
In mounting an international response, general guidance will
be useful but hardly adequate to successfully resolve crises affecting
very different regions. Landlocked countries will be less concerned
with defining duties to mitigate the effects of a tsunami, while coastal
countries will share this as a primary concern. Nonetheless, binding
regulations will be necessary not only to guarantee that the nerve
center is adequately informed throughout a region's ensuing ordeal,
but also to standardize the methods of warning and evacuation and the
priorities related to them. In cases where specific regions are
concerned with geographic issues, the law addressing international
piracy of aircraft can serve as a useful model:
Sometimes where a problem is peculiarly complex and
difficult in terms of its technical components, so that
the attempt to include large numbers of parties in an
agreement would be likely to produce only a long-
delayed and unwieldy document, the problem may best
be solved by the route of the bilateral treaty, the first
such treaty serving as a model for innumerable
subsequent treaties, so that, in the end, we have a
255. R.J. McKinnon & M.T. Sullivan, Mir Emergency Management: National
Arrangements for Managing the Public Safety Aspects of the Re-Entry of the Russian Mir
Space Station, 16 AUSTL. J. EMERGENCY MGMT. 36, 36 (2001).
256. Mullavey, supra note 178, at 25 (noting as one of a number of specific difficulties
pertaining to joint mitigation efforts "the language barrier because both English and French
speaking firefighters participated").
257. Inglesby et al., supra note 249, at 440 (noting "widespread lack of familiarity with
the terms used by the emergency management community" when members of other technical
fields were attempting to respond to vital information that featured such terminology).
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series of more or less interlocking treaties that, in their
sum, may present all the advantages of universality of
a multilateral treaty, but perhaps also the advantage,
secured by the more intensive and concentrated
method of negotiation involved in bilateral treaties, of
greater relative precision and concreteness as to
objectives.25
At the very least, however, uniform standards are necessary to
address threat detection, confirmation, warning, and the provision of
mutual aid, since a lack of coordination in any of these stages can lead
to catastrophic results.
As for the format of a controlling document, the International
Health Regulations provide important insight. Their purpose is "to
provide a universal code of practice to standardize the procedures to
be followed by all countries in controlling ... diseases.,
259
Specifically, the document "specifies what should be done by whom
and for what purpose-whether it is notification or measures for
prevention and control .... 260 As they have been revised to address
new and unfamiliar diseases, reflecting an enhanced effort to mitigate
the unknown, the new requirements and the practical guidance
interpreting such regulations could inform natural impact
policymakers.26'
B. Recommendation Two: Learnfrom Analogous Experiences
Before adopting a coordinated international approach, nations
should survey existing international efforts based on cooperative
preservation, such as those that mitigate extreme and unpredictable
terrorist threats, infectious disease, and transboundary forest fires and
should learn from these collective experiences.
This recommendation aims to conserve resources and make an
international effort more manageable. The natural impact mitigation
effort can avoid common pitfalls by reviewing the transcripts of
arbitrations in which disputes were resolved between conflicting
members of existing organizations, examining revisions to
258. EDWARD MCWHINNEY, AERIAL PIRACY AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE
ILLEGAL DIVERSION OF AIRCRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (2d. rev. ed. 1987).
259. WHO, The Revisions of the International Health Regulations, 71 WKLY.
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organizational guidelines (such as the recent revisions to the
International Health Regulations), and discussing -with facilitators of
disaster simulations how they have gained the most from using
specific methods. These inquiries will make natural impact
mitigation far more approachable from a financial perspective and far
less intimidating. Many would agree that this brainstorming is an
obligation rather than a choice, especially given the many years of
experience acquired by existing programs:
[T]he architects of international regulation will want to
look broadly at all regulatory regimes, comparing one
with another to avoid pitfalls and maximize
effectiveness in designing the particular regime with
which they are concerned .... [Further,] international
lawyers handling matters governed by one regulatory
regime will want to draw upon the law and precedents
developed under other such regimes.
262
Comparative analysis of existing practices will reveal certain
standards of conduct that supplement the requirements of law.
C. Recommendation Three: Conduct Targeted Simulation
Exercises
Finally, nations should set a goal of conducting two
simulations to aid in the development of international policy on
natural impact mitigation. The first simulation should focus on
coordination of threat detection, confirmation, and communication
procedures. The second simulation should focus on actual responses
to a detected threat. For the second simulation, nations should
simulate methods of diverting or destroying the threatening object,
preparatory measures such as evacuations from projected impact
zones, and post-impact response such as reaction to a tsunami.
Perhaps such simulations eventually may be incorporated into
existing international programs, such as TOPOFF or INEX.
The members of each existing effort to mitigate unforeseen
transboundary harm will likely agree that the learning curve is a very
"steep" one in their respective organizations.2 63 At the TOPOFF 2000
262. Daniel G. Partan, Note, International Administrative Law, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 639,
639-40 (1981).
263. Jay C. Butler et at., Collaboration Between Public Health and Law Enjbrcement:
New Paradigms and Partnerships for Bioterrorism Planning and Response, 8 EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1152, 1154 (2002) (observing that the response of health professionals
to the threat of unexpected mass disaster "has necessitated a steep learning curve").
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exercise, participants learned crucial lessons about the incompatibility
of a familiar consensus-building model with times of crisis, the
inadequacy of conference calls to make crucial decisions, and the lack
of time to conduct research for instantaneous decisions.264 Without
simulating responses to crises, these participants would have risked
learning these lessons through actual blunders that could have easily
resulted in the loss of life.
Any natural impact mitigation strategy adopted will involve
numerous technological aspects that require new and untried
approaches to the detection and destruction of harmful objects. To
overtax the international approach from the outset with obligations to
develop a completely new simulation program would be
counterproductive. Yet, those mitigating natural impact must be
prepared to respond to a set of crucial questions:
How do you practice mutual aid, if you do not
regularly have [such crises] to practice on[;] .... what
is the most desirable location to hold the exercise[;]
How much equipment and personnel is necessary[;J
[a]nd how does the host State benefit if they do not
have an opportunity to send equipment and personnel
to another State?
265
Those working to mitigate natural impact can simulate threats
in different ways, some of which require fewer resources than others.
The U.S. Department of Energy surveyed existing approaches to
disaster response simulations and classified them into three
categories:
(1) Table Top Exercises;266
(2) Command Post Exercises;267 and
(3) Field Exercises. 68
264. Inglesby et al., supra note 249, at 439.
265. Mullavey, supra note 178, at 24.
266. "During a tabletop exercise or TTX, participants test an emergency response plan
and its standard operating procedure by informally "walking through" a hypothetical
emergency. The TTX allows policy-making officials and key staff with emergency
management responsibilities to identify and resolve problems with the emergency plan."
EPA Response, supra note 169.
267. "A CPX is more extensive than a tabletop exercise in that it usually involves
activities in other than a conference room atmosphere. It usually focuses on a single response
or activity, for example, command and control. It can also involve limited deployment of
equipment for a specific purpose." Id.
268. "An FTX is more extensive and realistic than either a tabletop or command post
exercise. Activities extend beyond a conference room or operations center, taking place in a
field environment over several days. An FTX tests many functions in an emergency plan in
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Testing the adequacy of the prospective organization's
procedures may initially involve cost efficient table top simulations or
exercises, rather than full scale mobilizations of equipment and
personnel. As the organization's approach becomes operational,
participants can endeavor further along the spectrum until they reach
a level that will enable them to reap the benefits of a full-fledged field
exercise, such as TOPOFF. Such a field exercise may be conducted
most efficiently within the context of existing simulations, e.g., by
including natural impact mitigation as a component of TOPOFF 3.
Those working to mitigate natural impact also will also do
well to recognize that the people who are most in need of training and
simulations are officials whose decisions will affect communities.
This is not to detract from the importance of an educational effort to
keep the public apprised of the nature of the threat or measures and to
aid the public's awareness of warnings that may be issued. Yet, the
types of activities for which the government has responsibility are
beyond these very basic considerations. For example, in
implementing "a plan to vaccinate [the] entire population [of
Colorado] against smallpox within three to five days," Robin Koons,
Director of a recent antiterrorism grant, explained how the question
must be framed to achieve optimal results: "It's more like where
would we go versus where would [residents] go." '269
With the single exception of the need to provide immediate
psychological services to the victims of mass disaster, the common
mitigation approach across the varied situations focuses. on the
officials who must make the crucial determinations. Training and
simulation that rest squarely on the preparation of trained experts,
rather than the entire public, from the outset are much more
manageable and cost effective.
D. Conclusion
One of the reasons why the global commons, including
Antarctica, the high seas, and space in general, suffer from a lack of
practical solutions is the lack of a single organization responsible as a
trustee for protecting these environments. Without any oversight
mechanism for responses to international disasters, nations have
adopted incompatible approaches among themselves.27" While this
realistic situations." Id.
269. Peckenpaugh, supra note 159, at 18.
270. Harlan Cleveland, The Global Commons: Management of the Use of Oceans,
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Article focused on natural impacts, the framework developed to
mitigate such threats is largely applicable to all types of unexpected
natural harm. The basis for the coupling of law with science is
cooperative preservation, a safety function that must be the first
priority in any of the commons. 7 All nations benefit from the
foregoing approach to natural impact because it necessarily
incorporates a framework that assigns responsibilities for natural
harm.
While there is much to be gained from the spillover effects of
a uniform international approach to natural impact, countries can also
benefit from the lesson learned by Emergency Management Australia
during the fall of the Mir Space Station: "When prevention is not an
option and mitigation efforts are of minimal utility, preparedness
efforts are the only options left open to a vulnerable community. 272
This realization explains the necessity of treating this threat
seriously-as long as there is a potential that the threat of an
incoming asteroid or comet will go undetected, or that its deflection
or destruction will be ineffective, preparedness remains a crucial
factor in the mitigation process. 273 Legal principles suggest that the
consequences of natural impact and other extreme natural harms are
simply too great to ignore.
Weather, Antarctica and Outer Space, FUTURIST, May 1993, at 9.
271. Those who conduct joint operations in the Commons will inevitably agree with
Harlan Cleveland that "you don't need a visa to visit Antarctica, [for example,] but you do
need plenty of help to get there and survive." Id.
272. McKinnon & Sullivan, supra note 255, at 37.
273. See Seamone, supra note 10, at 1097 & 1097 n.31 (explaining that "mitigation"
includes plans to deal with the harm created by potential threats, not only measures to prevent
harm from occurring); Diego Llumds, Terrorism: Low Probability, High Consequence, BULL.
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 14, 14 (1999) (recognizing that "just because a terrorist attack using
chemical or biological weapons hasn't caused mass casualties yet, doesn't mean that it never
will").
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